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Abstract(
The following paper examines how the European Central Bank (ECB) has responded 
to the challenges of the financial and sovereign debt crisis within the EMU. First theo-
ry is introduced to get an understanding of the problems that the ECB faces. The theo-
ry regards central banking, optimum currency areas, and the monetary transmission 
mechanism. The theory is followed by an explanation of the crisis that struck the Eu-
rozone in 2008, which revealed macroeconomic imbalances in the Eurozone. This 
leads to the analysis, which mainly focuses on analysing how the ECB has attempted 
to re-establish the singles of its monetary policy transmission through non-standard 
measures. In the light of the macroeconomic imbalances and the non-standard 
measures introduced by the ECB, two alternative solutions beyond the potential of the 
ECB are suggested.   
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Abbreviations:(
• ATM – Automated Teller Machine 
• BIS – Bank for International Sttlements 
• CBPP - Covered Bond Purchasing Programs 
• EBA – European Banking Authority 
• ECB – European Central Bank 
• ECOFIN - Council of Economic and Financial Affairs 
• EDP - Excessive Deficit Procedure 
• EFSF - European Financial Stability Facility 
• EMU – Economic and monetary Union 
• ESCB – European System of Central Banks 
• ESM - European Stability Mechanism 
• EU – European Union 
• FFA – Financial assistance Facility Agreement 
• FROB - Fondo de reestructuración ordenada bancaria or the fund for orderly 
bank restructuring 
• GDP – Gross Domestic Product 
• HICP - Harmonized index for Consumer Prices 
• IMF – International Monetary Fund 
• LIA – Lending Into Arreas 
• LTRO - Longer-term refinancing operations 
• MoU – Memorandum of Understanding 
• MRO – Main Refinancing Operations 
• NCB – National Central Bank 
• OCA - Optimum Currency Area 
• OECD – Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
• OJEU – Official Journal of The European union 
• OMO – Open Market Operations 
• OMT - Outright Monetary Transactions 
• PMI - Purchasing Managing Index 
• PoCC - Protocol on Convergence Criteria’s 
• SGP – Stability & Growth Pact 
• SME – small to medium size enterprises 
• SMP - Securities Markets Programme  
• SRM - Single Resolution Mechanism 
• SSM - Single Supervisory Mechanism 
• Target2 -  Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross Settlement Express 
Transfer System or real-time gross settlement 
• TEESM – Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism 
• TEU – Treaty of the European Union 
• TFEU - Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
• TSCGEMU - The treaty on stability, coordination and governance in the eco-
nomic and monetary union 
• ULC – Unit Labor Costs!  
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Whatever(it(Takes(
In December 1991 the ambitions were high in the European Community. The reason 
was the unveiling of the Maastrich treaty, which transformed the European Communi-
ty into the European Union (EU), establishing a Treaty on the European Union (TEU) 
along with the framework for an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).  Before the 
EMU, the EU had tried several different monetary collaborations, but the attempts had 
exposed the need for further integration. The argument for an EMU was that it would 
maximize the effects of the single market, and provide wealth and growth within the 
union. It was envisioned to increase trade by eliminating the exchange rates between 
member states (De Grauwe, 2009: p. 57; Jespersen, 2010: p. 17). In 1998 the Europe-
an Council decided that the EMU would consist of 11 member states. However it was 
not all participants of the EU that wished to join the EMU, and Denmark, Sweden and 
the United Kingdom chose not to adopt the common currency (Verdun, 2010: p.331).  
 
On midnight between December 31st and January 1st 2002, Greece joined the Euro-
zone as the 12th member state.  The celebrations ushered in not only a new year but 
also a new chapter in the illustrious history of the EU. Celebrations were taking place 
all over Europe, from Frankfurt to Athens, as the first notes and coins with the ‘€’-
symbol were being withdrawn from ATM’s across Europe. Syntagma Square in cen-
tral Athens was illuminated by a large pyramid with the €-symbol on top. The intro-
duction of the new banknotes was deemed a massive success. (The Guardian - Euro-
zone Crisis; BBC – Euro cash launch ‘tremendous success’) 
 
Celebrations were followed by what appeared to be impressive economic results 
across the Eurozone for the next six years. Interest rate spreads; both on Government 
bonds and private borrowing, between the countries narrowed significantly and 
helped fuel impressive GDP-growth figures for the members of the Euro. For the most 
part even the countries, that have been spending the past couple of years on the brink 
of default and on the receiving end of massive financial support were experiencing 
great growth in the economy all the while government deficits were turned to surplus-
es helping their public debt levels to impressive lows. Ireland and Spain recorded 
~25pct./GDP and ~36pct./GDP respectively in 2007, significantly lower than both 
Germany and the required level in the Stability and Growth Pact (Eurostat – General 
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Government Gross Debt).  By all accounts, the grandiose economic experiment sym-
bolised by the little € were perceived as a massive success. 
 
Barely seven years on, on September 15th 2008, the American investment bank Leh-
mann Brothers filed for bankruptcy and sparked what has, until now, been five years 
of frantic economic turmoil in the Eurozone due to an asymmetric economic shock. 
 
The euphoric scenes on Syntagma Square have been replaced with large demonstra-
tions against the draconian austerity measures, which the Greek government has been 
forced to impose on its citizens. Spanish budget surpluses have been turned to large 
deficits, increasing the public debt burden in turn replacing the historically low inter-
est rates with historically high ones. Unemployment has skyrocketed in large parts of 
the Eurozone and the high GDP-growth has vanished. (OECD – Quarterly GDP 
Growth; Eurostat – Unemployment rate, by sex) The party is over, and decision-
makers across the Eurozone have been left with headaches, resembling those incurred 
by a serious hangover, pondering solutions to the deep flaws in the economic- and 
monetary system the crisis revealed. 
 
On Kaiserstraße 29 in Frankfurt am Main you find the Eurotower, a 39-storey 148m 
tall building with 78.000 square meters of floor space and a blue € riddled with yellow 
stars outside the front door. This is the office of the European Central Bank (ECB), at 
least until they relocate to a newer and larger building in 2014. This is one of the most 
important institutions in the EU’s response to the crisis. 
 
From its conception in 1998 the primary mandate of the ECB has been to ensure price 
stability, as defined in TFEU article 125, in the Eurozone by controlling the monetary 
policy to keep the average price inflation close to or slightly below 2 per cent for the 
~300 million citizens using the euro as a legal tender.  
 
Ten years after the celebratory atmosphere ensued as the Euro was being introduced 
as legal tender in the Eurozone, on the 26 of July 2012 at the Global investment Con-
ference in London, President of the European Central Bank Mario Draghi announced 
that, “(…) within our mandate, the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve 
the euro. And believe me, it will be enough.“ (Draghi, 2012, p.1)  
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Immediately following the press conference doubt was not alleviated but increased. It 
had been clear for some time, that merely tinkering with the interest rate was not 
enough. The interest rate had been lowered time and time again (Figure 1), but trust in 
southern banks would not return. Trust is essential in the economic system, and the 
announcement was followed by an extensive expansion of competences and institu-
tional role of the ECB. The ECB on its own has expanded the measures used to con-
trol the monetary policy, and the EU has set up support schemes for distressed Mem-
ber States in which the ECB plays an important role. In October 2013 the first part of 
a new Banking Union, aimed at restoring the shattered faith in the European banking 
system, was approved centralising key aspects of bank supervision in the Eurozone 
(European Commission – Banking Union). On 18th December 2013 the ministers of 
finance and economy reconvene to discuss the final details of the Single Resolution 
Mechanism aimed at orderly resolution of failing banks. (Information – Telegram) 
 
Figure 1 
Departing from its ordinary monetary policy measures, this paper identifies and eval-
uates the pressing monetary and macroeconomic imbalances facing the Eurozone as a 
whole. We examine how the ECB is attempting to achieve its primary mandate of 
price stability with financial and economic stability, primarily through the new 
framework for supervision and resolution and banks, in the context of a fragile Euro-
zone.  
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Problem(formulation(
What effect has the expansion of the European Central Bank’s competences and 
measures had on the financial- and sovereign debt crisis in the Euro Area? 
Working Questions 
In order to comprehensively answer the problem formulation, the following working 
questions have been devised:  
- How does the European Central Bank operate and what competences does it 
hold? 
- What kind of crisis is this? 
- How has the ECB responded 
- What could be done beyond the scope of the European Central Bank? 
Chapter overview 
The first chapter is a description of what a central bank is, which monetary policy 
instruments it normally has at its disposal and how they work. Furthermore, it is an 
explanation of the monetary trilemma that it must cope with, the monetary transmis-
sion mechanism and finally the rationale behind inflation targeting. 
 
The Second chapter is a description of the theory behind optimum currency areas. It 
reveals how the EMU lacks important criteria in relation to the theoretical require-
ments, which partly causes and restrains the options for handling the macroeconomic 
imbalances in the Euro Area as well as the financial- and sovereign debt crisis. 
 
The Third chapter is an empirical presentation of the macroeconomic imbalances in 
the EMU, which has become imminent since the outbreak of the financial crisis in 
2008. It shows different parameters for the problematic differences between the core 
and periphery of the Euro Area. This is done with first and second chapter as its 
framework.  
 
The fourth chapter is a description and analysis of the different ECB operations and 
measures taken during the crisis. Both the measures and operations will be analysed 
using the analytical framework presented in the theoretical chapter. We also assess the 
effect of the actions taken by the ECB. 
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The fifth chapter is a presentation of a more comprehensive proposal for addressing 
the macroeconomic imbalances in the Eurozone, drawing on inspiration from the 
shortcomings discovered in the preceding chapters. We debate the possibility of more 
fiscal integration in the Eurozone and debt restructuring in the periphery.   
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1.Theory(on(central(banking(
 
In the following chapter our theoretical framework for analysing the ECBs compe-
tences is presented. The framework will consist of a description of a central banks 
functions and policy instruments. Further, the monetary trilemma is explained along 
with the monetary transmission mechanism. The framework will help answer the 
problem formulation. 
 
1.1 Central Banking 
A central bank is by definition responsible for printing money, setting interest rates 
and acting as banker to commercial banks and the government (Begg 2002: 225).  In 
relation to this, the following section will provide a description of various monetary 
policy-tools in the hands of a central bank. These should theoretically give it an op-
portunity, to handle its task of regulating the money supply. Setting the treaty-
anchored primary goal of the ECB; securing price stability, temporarily these men-
tioned monetary tools can also be useful towards stimulating the economy as a whole 
in order to pursuit a goal related to a wider perspective of future growth and a general 
sound economic development.  
The(key(interest(rate:(
The key interest rate is the main monetary policy tool at a central bank’s disposal 
(ECB 2013). The key interest rate is the one paid by commercial banks when borrow-
ing from the ECB. Increasing the key interest rate will make commercial banks hold 
larger cash reserves in order to avoid borrowing from the central bank, thereby lower-
ing the bank deposits ratio of cash reserves, reducing the multiplier and ultimately 
reducing the money supply. If the key interest rate is lowered the incentive to invest is 
elevated creating an increase of capital and growth in the market. In the opposite sce-
nario, an increase in the cost of borrowing will decreasing the profitability of invest-
ment, lower investment and increase savings (B. M. Friedmann, 2001: p. 9978). 
Reserve(requirements:(
The reserve ratio denotes the amount of cash required in the vaults of banks to meet 
possible withdrawals. The actual reserves are commonly smaller than the actual de-
posit since there is an incentive for the bank to hold interest bearing liquid assets in-
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stead of cash (Begg 2009: 221) and also because all deposits are not withdrawn daily 
(ibid., p.  222). 
The reserve ratio decides how much money the banks are able to create through loans 
and thereby what the money multiplier is. The money multiplier is the ratio of the 
money supply to the monetary base: 
 !"#$!! "#$%&#%'( = 1!"#"$%"!!"#$% 
 
Thereby a lower reserve ratio means a higher money multiplier. This ratio can be im-
posed by law thereby making it useful as a monetary policy instrument for the regula-
tion of the money supply. Making requirements of a larger reserve ratio will decrease 
the possibility of banks increasing the money supply through loans, and thereby mak-
ing the money multiplier smaller (ibid. p. 226). 
An example including the central bank looks as follows: A central bank deposits 1 
million in a commercial bank. This bank keeps 100,000 in its reserves (a reserve ratio 
of 10 pct. in this example) and lends out the remaining 900,000. The borrower buys a 
new car from a dealership and the 900,000 are now deposited back into the banking 
system. The bank then keeps 90,000 and lends out the sustaining 810.000 and so on. 
In the end the 1 million was multiplied to 10 millions (cf. money multiplier formula). 
In this way one million becomes significantly more and therefore magnifies the mone-
tary policy of the Central Bank. This is the Monetary Multiplier at work in a closed 
system with a high level of trust. 
Open(market(operations(
Another very relevant instrument of a central bank is the so-called Open Market Op-
erations. This is the central bank’s purchase or sale of securities in the open market in 
exchange for cash carried out by the central bank (Begg 2009: 226). The rationales for 
these operations are to in- or decrease the monetary base in the society. An acquisition 
of bonds increases the monetary base, and a sale of bonds decreases the monetary 
base. 
This instrument is used both regularly by the ECB but also in a more extensive fash-
ion through its crisis responds. The different variances of OMOs shall however not be 
examined here (for an overview: ECB 2013a). 
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1.2 The Monetary Trilemma – The impossible trinity 
When states are navigating their economies on the world market they face the classic 
macroeconomic trilemma, three ill paired goals: An independent monetary policy (the 
ability to control the central bank interest rate), free capital movement and a fixed 
exchange rate. Only two of the goals can be pursued at the same time due to the fol-
lowing rationality. Economic History has shown that, when a country pegs to a base 
currency (fixed exchange rate) and when capital flows are free, interest parity ties the 
domestic interest rate to that of the base currency. If monetary efforts are taken to 
differentiate the domestic interest rate from the global interest rate, to control infla-
tion, arbitrage in the open market will depreciate/appreciate the exchange rate. The 
theory being, if you want a fixed exchange rate and free capital movement you cannot 
have an independent monetary policy (Obstfeld, Shambaugh & Taylor 2004). 
 
A government has three possible combinations to choose from: 1) a fixed exchange 
rate and free capital movement. If the government pursues a fixed exchange rate and 
free capital movement, then it must sacrifice the ability to set the domestic interest 
rate independently, which results in no independent monetary policy. 2) an independ-
ent monetary policy and free capital movement. If the Central Bank chooses to have 
an independent monetary policy and free capital movement, then it sacrifices the pos-
sibility of a fixed exchange rate. 3) fixed exchange rate and independent monetary 
policy. If the central bank chooses to have a fixed exchange rate and an independent 
monetary policy, then free capital movement must be abandoned. (Obstfeld et al. 
2004: p.3) 
For counties that are be liberal market economies the trilemma has become more of a 
dilemma due to the fact that capital movement must be characterised as free. This 
limits the policy options to no. 1 and 2 of the above. The countries participating in the 
EMU have the locked their exchange rates between them since they all have the same 
currency (the euro), therefore they only have free movement of capital left and must 
collectively decide on an independent monetary policy through the governing board 
of the ECB. Countries outside the Eurozone, who are still members of the ERMII, like 
Denmark, has pegged their currency to the euro thereby losing the ability to have a 
free exchange rate but also loosing the ability to have an independent monetary policy 
since this is now carried out centrally in the ECB. 
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1.3 The monetary transmission mechanism 
The monetary transmission mechanism is the process through which Central Bank 
policy affects the general economy and price levels. The effect of the transmission 
mechanism is subdued to a number of variables such as changes in the global econo-
my, fiscal policy, changes in bank capital other short to long-term changes. Therefore, 
monetary policy is not an exact science and it is hard to predict the precise effect of 
the monetary policy on the economy. In the illustration below we present the trans-
mission channels of monetary policy decisions. 
 
Figure 2 
 
As Shown in Figure 2, the monetary transmission system is affected by several fac-
tors, and at first glance can seem quite confusing, therefore the main interactions of 
the figure is explained. The first box in Figure 2 is the official interest rates including 
the main short-term refinancing rate. Here it is important to understand that a central 
bank provides funds to the banking system through ordinary lending. Given the cen-
tral bank’s monopoly on the issuance of money, the central bank completely controls 
the interest rate (ECB - Transmission mechanism of monetary policy; Jespersen, 2009: 
p. 180). As Figure 2 indicates, the official interest rates affect the next level in the 
Source: ECB - Transmission mechanism of monetary policy 
The Monetary Policy Transmission Mechanism 
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system, which is the money market’s interest rate and expectations. The money mar-
ket is directly affected when the official interest rate is changed, which will have ef-
fects on the lending and deposit rates set by banks (ECB - Transmission mechanism of 
monetary policy; Jespersen, 2009: p. 181). This leads to expectation, which in the 
financial system determines the willingness of investments. Thus, the expectation of 
future changes in the main refinancing rate has a direct effect on the medium and 
long-term interest rate of commercial banks. Through this channel long-term interest 
rates are very much dependant on market expectations about the short-term rates. To 
dampen the volatility of financial markets, monetary policy can guide market expecta-
tion through inflation targeting and thereby price developments. This requires a cen-
tral bank with a high degree of credibility in order to have the required effect. In this 
way, firms and banks can focus on growth and development without the fear of rising 
prices or deflation, thus reaching a steady and sustainable growth (ECB - Transmis-
sion mechanism of monetary policy). This takes us a level down in the monetary 
transmission system to asset prices. Financial crisis often occurs in relation to asset 
prices. This is because that asset prices rises with the economy, for instance stocks or 
real-estate prices. However, when the economy is contracting the asset prices falls as 
well, for instance on real estate. This will cause equity loss for financial institutions, 
which in a worst-case scenario could lead to liquidity- and consequently solvency 
problems (Jespersen, 2009: p 184). A change in the official interest rate would also 
have an effect on savings, and investment decisions taken by the households. If the 
official interest rate is increased, it will lead to a higher interest rate on lending from 
the financial institutions causing reduced consumption. In the reverse scenario the 
effects would be the opposite. Asset prices and “the money and the credit” box are 
inter-connected. This is because asset prices will have an effect, as the household is 
able to obtain loans transferring its equity in its real-estate into capital (ECB - Trans-
mission mechanism of monetary policy). Credit within an economy is said to be sensi-
tive to the official interest rate. If the official interest rate is put at a higher level, it 
will increase the risk of borrowers not repaying their loans, which will lead to higher 
interest rates on bank loans. This will cause fewer loans on the interbank market, 
causing it to freeze with the effects of less credit (Jespersen, 2009: p.181). Less capi-
tal on the domestic market will lead to a change in consumption and investments. This 
will alter the demand for goods and services and thereby having an effect on wages 
and the price level.  
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It should be obvious that the monetary transmission mechanism consists of wide areas 
of interests, which are interconnected in various manners. The monetary transmission 
mechanism will be useful in the understanding of the financial- and sovereign debt 
crisis. 
Inflation targeting 
Inflation targeting is a monetary policy framework in which the central bank publicly 
announces an official inflation target and acknowledging that price stability, meaning 
low and stable inflation, is the long-term goal. In this monetary policy framework 
inflation targeting is preferred to money supply targeting. According to Mervyn Allis-
tor King, the former Governor of The Bank of England, inflation targeting is preferred 
to money supply targeting due to the instability of money demand and money supply, 
and that inflation targeting is superior in short run responses to external shocks 
(King, M. 1997, Christos Karpetis 2006) 
 
Inflation targeting serves as a nominal anchor policy pinning down the commitment to 
price stability and the medium to long-term discipline of the Central Bank. This al-
lows investors, firms and citizens to make long-term decisions knowing that their pur-
chasing power of investments will not be consumed by soaring inflation. However, an 
inflation target does not constrain the Central Bank from acting upon secondary ob-
jectives such as short-term stabilisation, created by external turmoil for an example, as 
long as the primary objective is not compromised (Freedman & Laxton, 2009: p. 12). 
 
Sub-conclussion 
This chapter has provided a description of what a central bank is, and which tools it 
should have in form of monetary policy instruments. This, as shown with the mone-
tary transmission mechanism, has an effect on almost all parts of society. The frame-
work for a central bank will in this paper be used in relation to the ECB and the actual 
real-world obstacles it faces. Furthermore, obstacles in form of the monetary trilemma 
was introduced, as it will be relevant in relation to understanding the sovereign’s eco-
nomic latitude. The theoretical observations in relation to a central bank under normal 
circumstances are also useful in relation to the non-standard measures taken by the 
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ECB during the crisis. These measures go above and beyond what has been described 
here, which serves to emphasise that theory is not always reflected in reality.  
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2.(Optimum(Currency(Area(Theory(
In the following chapter the ideas behind an Optimum Currency Area are introduced. 
This is in order to understand the theoretical framework, which a monetary union is 
drawing upon. The chapter will start with an introduction to an optimum currency 
area. This will be followed by the economic rationale behind the EMU, which leads to 
an explanation of its execution. 
 
A construction such as the Eurozone is not created from one day to another. In order 
to create a monetary union like the Eurozone some conditions has to be met. A widely 
accepted factor, which needs to be fulfilled for a monetary union to be of any success, 
is the idea of an Optimum Currency Area (OCA). A contributor to the concept of 
OCA is Robert A. Mundell. He first set up the definition of an OCA as: “a domain 
within which exchange rates are fixed”. The reason for the fixed exchange rates is 
that it would create trust between sovereign states, as flexible exchange rates could 
result in a more volatile market. Mundell believed that the OCA was to be found on a 
regional level, and not on a world scale. It was therefore of utmost importance that the 
region had shared values such as similar cultures, complementary economies etc. 
(Mundell, 1961: p. 660; Bordo et al. 2013: p. 479). When explaining currency areas 
and common currencies, Mundell emphasises that it should only have one single su-
pranational central bank (Mundell, 1961: p. 658; Kenan, 2000: p. 6). For sovereign 
states to gather in a monetary union the member states needs to be equal, meaning that 
the trade should be highly concentrated between the member states. (Mundell, 1961: 
p. 661; Bordo et al. 2013: p. 454). The Sovereign states would only deem it feasible to 
join a monetary union, if the benefits of adopting a common currency outweigh the 
costs of abandoning its own independent monetary policy (Bordo et. al., 2013: p.453). 
There could also be spill-over effects of joining a monetary union. An example is a 
member state wanting to  integrate further, not only by more capital movement be-
tween states, but also by improving the labour movement (Mundell, 1961: p 661). 
 
The idea of a common currency within the borders of Europe has been a long way 
coming. When the treaty of Paris was signed in 1951 establishing the European Coal 
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and Steel Community, no one expected that it would lead to the creation of the Euro 
merely 50 years later. As already mentioned, the first steps towards the EMU were 
taken with the Maastricht treaty in 1991(Bulmer, 2007: p.8). The treaty was signed in 
February 1992, but not by all the member states of the EU, as Denmark, Sweden and 
the United Kingdom opted out of the common currency. The Maastricht treaty laid 
down the framework for the EMU, and included the convergence criteria, which de-
fined targets for price stability, government finances, and long-term interest rates. 
These criteria were meant to create a framework ensuring that all of the participants in 
the EMU had similar economies leading to an OCA, as well as reducing the risk of 
contagion by limiting public debt. They were continued in the Stability and Growth 
pact (SGP), forcing the member states to continue to adhere to the convergence crite-
ria upon joining the EMU. The participating member states were allured with prosper-
ity and the idea that the economic benefits for the sovereign states would outweigh the 
cost (Jespersen, 2010: p.19). 
The Eurozone criteria for an Optimum Currency Area 
The Eurozone construction is based on the ideas of an OCA, and therefore criteria are 
set up in order to secure a fairly equal financial set-up. This is done through article 
140 along with the protocol on convergence criteria and the protocol on excessive 
deficit. The first criterion is that the applicant country should have a high degree of 
price stability. This will be measured through the rate of inflation and in order to join 
the rate must not exceed 1,5 pct. relative to the three best performing member states 
(PoCC, article 1). Secondly the governments need to show sustainability of the public 
budget, to avoid countries running an excessive deficit. The Commission, pending 
approval by the Council, defines whether or not a deficit is excessive. (TFEU, Article 
126(6))  
 
This criterion for an excessive deficit is described in the Protocol on the Excessive 
Deficit Procedure and the public budget deficit must not exceed 3 pct. and the debt 
level must not exceed 60 pct., both measured against GDP. These numbers are carried 
over to the SGP, which has been accompanied by the Fiscal Compact. The third crite-
rion is that the applicant country must have normal fluctuation margins measured 
through the exchange rate within a timeframe of at least two years. The normal fluc-
tuation margins have to be accompanied by no devaluation against the Euro. The 
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fourth criterion is that durability of convergence is to be achieved by following the 
three other steps, and this should be reflected in the long-term interest rate level. The 
long-term interest rate must not exceed 2 pct. compared with the three member states 
showing lowest inflation on the Harmonised index for Consumer Prices (HICP). 
 
When joining the Euro, member states must adhere to the SGP, and also it has to sac-
rifice its monetary policy to the ECB. The countries still maintain the ability to run 
their own fiscal policy. This construction is said to be sui generis. This is due to the 
separation of the monetary policy and the fiscal policy. In addition to this, theory has 
suggested that a fiscal policy is essential for a monetary union in order to avoid im-
balances within the union (Kenen, 2000: p. 8). Benjamin M. Friedman (2001: p. 9976) 
explains this further arguing that: 
“Monetary policy, as carried out in practice, is made possible by the ex-
istence of fiscal policy, in the usual sense of overall government spend-
ing and taxing and the government’s need to finance any excess of ex-
penditures over revenues by means of borrowing.”  
 
The only constraints, before the creation of ‘the treaty on stability, coordination and 
governance in the economic and monetary union’, to the sovereign states’ fiscal poli-
cy were the same as set up in the convergence criteria and does not create a fiscal sys-
tem that can possibly fix macroeconomic imbalances within the union, but only a so-
lution to price stability. Therefore, member states have been allowed to run its own 
fiscal system, with the SGP criteria as their only restraint (Bordo et. al., 2013: pp. 
456). After Germany and France broke the 60 pct. debt to GDP limit with no reper-
cussions in 2003, the limits have not been enforced. Greece, Portugal and indeed 
France have never since lived up to that rule. In our previous study, we concluded that 
the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) had contributed to the macroeconomic 
imbalances between the member states. This was evident through high surpluses on 
the balance of payment in the core, while the peripheral countries experienced a large 
deficit (Etzerodt, Hoff & Sørensen, 2013). However, as the countries are in a mone-
tary union it is no longer possible to devaluate their individual currencies. The re-
maining option within the Eurozone is internal devaluation, which in Spain, meant 
austerity measures causing a rise in unemployment, but in the longer run it is believed 
to cause an increase in competiveness (Lapavitstas et al., 2012: p. 63). 
 21 
The Fiscal Compact 
The sovereign debt crisis that struck in 2010 has called for extraordinary measures to 
safeguard the Eurozone, indicating that the existing framework was insufficient in this 
regard. The European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) came first and was later 
replaced by a permanent solution, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). Later on 
the ‘treaty on stability, coordination and governance in the economic and monetary 
union’ has supplemented the ESM, including an article regarding Fiscal compact. The 
treaty introduced a limit on the structural deficit for a member state of 0,5 pct. of the 
GDP at market prices, essentially strengthening the SGP. For this there is one excep-
tion defined through the fiscal compact, and that is in situations: 
 
“Where the ratio of the general government debt to gross domestic 
product at market prices is significantly below 60 pct. and where risks 
in terms of long-term sustainability of public finances are low, the lower 
limit of the medium-term objective specified under point (b) can reach a 
structural deficit of at most 1,0 pct. of the gross domestic product at 
market prices.” (TSCGEMU, article 3(1)(d)) 
 
If a Member State does not comply with the medium-term objective a correction 
mechanism will automatically be initiated. This will cause the contracting party to 
implement measures to correct the deviations over a given timeframe. The fiscal 
compact also include an article regarding how the design of an excessive deficit pro-
cedure is formed.  
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3.(The(macroeconomic(imbalances(in(the(Euro(Area(
So far this paper has combined the theoretical reasoning of a central bank, and an Op-
timum Currency Area. The report now departs from its theoretical chapters and moves 
on to present the empirical evidence. Our project is mainly concerned with the institu-
tional evolution of the ECB as a response to the crisis. This chapter will focus on the 
economic imbalances within the Eurozone that we believe will be essential to over-
come in order to muster a credible attempt to resume the necessary economic growth 
and stabilisation clearly lacking at present day. We believe that the lacklustre em-
ployment rate, GDP growth rate and high debt levels of most Eurozone countries are 
not due to economic irresponsibility within the public sectors, maybe with the excep-
tion of Greece, but rather inherent weaknesses in the construct of the Eurozone. The 
favourable economic climate in the Eurozone for the first ~8 years may have masked 
these weaknesses, but as the crisis began these weaknesses have clearly shown them-
selves, and in order to avoid a similar situation in the future, they need to be addressed 
sooner rather than later. 
 
The different stages of the crisis are labelled as the build-up in 2000-2007, the finan-
cial turmoil from August 2007 – September 2008, the global financial crisis from 
September 2008 – May 2010 and finally the sovereign debt crisis from May 2010 to 
present day. This distinction is made, as the ECB and indeed the entire system of eco-
nomic governance has had to react very differently in the different stages. The distinc-
tion is inspired by Drudi et.al., 2012 from the article: The Interplay of Economic Re-
forms and Monetary Policy. This Chapter will primarily look at the build-up to the 
crisis and the first signs of financial turmoil in 2007. This is the period where the un-
derlying imbalances were slowly but surely established, waiting to burst in 2008-
2010. 
 
To make the analysis more convenient the most important Member States are placed 
in two distinct categories; namely the core and the periphery. The core countries are 
Germany, the Netherlands and France. The Periphery is Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portu-
gal and Spain. This distinction is somewhat arbitrary and does not take into account 
the inherent differences between the countries within the categories. Especially 
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Greece is different, and it may be ‘harsh’ on the other periphery countries to be in the 
same category as Greece. There should be no doubt that in Greece, the government 
has acted irresponsibly, but Greece only account for less than 3 pct. of the GDP in the 
Eurozone and 8 pct. of the GDP of the countries in crisis. And most importantly, none 
of the other periphery countries acted as irresponsibly as Greece (Krugmann, 2013: p. 
177). 
 
The Build up: 2000-2007 
When the Eurozone was established the ECB was meant to have a rather narrow role. 
This is evident in the article establishing the ECB and ESCB. The primary mandate of 
the ECB and ESCB, as described in TFEU article 127, is to maintain price stability. 
The ECB is essentially tasked with determining and carrying out the monetary policy 
of the Euro-countries. This rather narrow mandate is further emphasised by the so 
called ‘no-bailout clause’ in TFEU article 125. The article determines that neither the 
EU nor member states can be held liable or assume financial commitments from other 
governments or their bodies. Furthermore the EU, through the ECB only holds exclu-
sive regulatory competences within monetary policy cf. article 3 in the TFEU whereas 
economic policy can merely be coordinated within the current regulatory framework, 
cf. article 5 in the TFEU. The most comprehensive intervention in national economic 
policy is the fiscal compact, instigating rather strict rules on the budgetary soundness 
of the 12 participants1 (Eurozone Portal – Fiscal Compact Enters into Force). 
 
The Governing Board in the ECB has established that a suitable medium- long-term 
inflation target is a ~2pct. increase in the average HICP across the Eurozone. Meas-
ured against this target, the ECB has performed fairly well. As evident in Figure 3, the 
average inflation has been close to the 2pct. target in the entire period leading up to 
the crisis in 2008. 
                                                1!Austria,$Cyprus,$Germany,$Denmark,$Estonia,$Spain,$France,$Greece,$Italy,$Ireland,$Lithuania,$Lat<
via,$Portugal,$Romania,$Finland$and$Slovenia!
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Figure 3 
The ECB has quite successfully been able to navigate the favourable economic times 
by steadily increasing its main refinancing interest rate to correspond to the increasing 
and impressive growth rates across the Eurozone, thereby keeping inflation relatively 
close to the 2 pct. target. 
 
When the Eurozone was established rules on both the public budget deficit and debt 
level was limited at 3 pct. and 60 pct. respectively in order to prevent the situation we 
are facing today with excessive sovereign debt and budgetary deficit levels in some 
countries. Looking at the public budgets and total debt levels, the periphery countries 
were showing just as, if not more, impressive signs of growth than the core countries. 
This holds true, especially if Greece is excluded. Looking at both Figure 4 and Figure 
5 it is evident that the currently hardest hit countries were not underperforming the 
core, neither with respect to government debt nor public deficits. The average public 
deficit level in the periphery was smaller for 2 years and never went below the limit of 
-3 pct. of GDP as defined in the SGP. 
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Figure 4 
 
Figure 5 
The periphery countries were, on average, performing comparably well. This was also 
reflected in the yield on their bonds. Almost instantly after entering into the monetary 
union (Illustrated in Figure 6) the risk premiums attached to most periphery countries 
vaporised, meaning that both Spanish and Irish government bonds were perceived to 
be almost as safe as their German counterparts. However, as shown above, this did 
not result in a public spending spree. 
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Figure 6 
When the periphery countries actually performed comparably well with regards to the 
convergence criteria set up in the SGP and were not borrowing excessively, one can 
ask where it all went wrong. 
 
The(actual(root(of(the(financialK(and(sovereign(debt(crisis(
In hindsight it has become clear to most that the root of the crisis lie not in the criteria 
in the SGP, but rather in massive trade imbalances (Lapavitsas et al., 2012; Krugman, 
2013; Jespersen, 2012). Even official EU actors, have recognised that the root causes 
for the trade imbalances are key to solving the current crisis (2013-2014 Budget Plan, 
2012: pp. 3-4).  
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Figure 7 
 
The trade imbalances are illustrated in Figure 7, which clearly show that the large 
current account deficit in the periphery was offset by a corresponding surplus on the 
current account in the core countries. This large imbalance in trade was largely ig-
nored until the financial crisis began in 2008 (Krugman, 2013: p. 176). Once again it 
is worth stressing that this imbalance is not directly the result of irresponsible fiscal 
policy in the periphery, but rather due to other factors, which will be introduced in the 
following. 
 
It was in the private sector the perceived convergence was really being undermined. 
In Ireland and Spain for instance, the low interest rates were turned into housing 
booms, leading to grossly overvalued equity, enabling even higher lending with the 
inflated house prices as collateral. Essentially, the current account surpluses in the 
core countries had to be invested somewhere, and for the most part financial institu-
tions chose to invest in assets in the periphery. As evidenced below the, total claims 
of core banks on periphery countries was steadily rising throughout the build-up of 
the crisis and even into the period of financial turmoil in 2007-2008. 
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Figure 8 
Figure 8 show the build-up of claims measured against the total core GDP, showing 
that, in the first quarter of 2008 claims equalling ~65 pct. of the total core GDP was 
held in peripheral countries. The core countries pretty much doubled their exposure in 
the 3 years (BIS statistics do not go further back than ’05) on record. The financial 
institutions in the core continued to expand their exposure to the periphery, even in 
the period of financial turmoil (2007 – late 2008) emphasising the perceived credit-
worthiness of the periphery, seeing as capital in troubled times seek safety over re-
turns (Lapavitsas, 2012: pp. 47-49). 
 
There is no doubt then, that the fundamental imbalance in the Eurozone can be illus-
trated by the large trade imbalances and subsequently the reallocation of the core sur-
plus into the periphery. Core financial institutions could achieve a slightly higher 
yield on their investments in the periphery (Figure 6) while still investing in what was 
perceived to be safe assets. The question then remains, why this trade imbalance 
emerged and more importantly how it has contributed to the current financial- and 
sovereign debt crisis. 
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Investing the cheap credit 
Upon entering the Eurozone, the periphery countries, were essentially given a seem-
ingly endless line of credit (cf. the previous sections) to do with what they wanted by 
the core countries, and whereas the exact actions did vary, none of the countries in-
vested in higher productivity capacity (Higgins & Klitgaard, 2011). 
One trend similar across the periphery was that private consumption increased quite a 
lot, whereas the private consumption remained essentially flat in Germany, as evi-
denced in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9 
The rather modest increase in German consumption is mirrored in the debt-to-income 
ratio of the German households. Conversely, with soaring consumption in the periph-
ery rising debt levels soon followed. 
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Figure 10 
The increasing indebtedness in the periphery, illustrated in Figure 10, serve to show 
the source of the consumption presented in Figure 9 and establish the background for 
another problem, namely that an increase in consumption, be it for borrowed money 
or not, can lead to wage and price inflation. This is exactly what happened, especially 
in Ireland and Spain, where the borrowed money were used to develop and purchase 
residential and commercial real estate at continually higher prices leading to a bubble 
(Krugman, 2012: p. 180; Higgins & Klitgaard, 2011). 
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Figure 11 
As is evident in Figure 11 both Spain and Ireland have experienced significantly larg-
er fluctuations in their housing prices than the Eurozone average, especially Ireland 
experienced highly inflated house prices. 
 
The main point of the findings up until now is that, as a group at least, the periphery 
countries were performing quite well on the parameters in the SGP by reducing their 
public deficit and debt levels. Greece has once again been the main exception to this, 
but as mentioned earlier, Greece is a very small part of the European economy. None-
theless, after entering into the Eurozone, long-term government bond yield spreads 
across the periphery converged to the Eurozone average. The Core banks were lend-
ing freely to the periphery countries, which spurred an increase in private expenditure 
and in turn, an increase in the indebtedness of the households across the periphery. As 
illustrated in Figure 7, the balance of payment within the Eurozone is largely bal-
anced, however, the overall balance is primarily due to the excessive deficit/surplus in 
the periphery/core. Moreover, even if the large core exposure to the periphery does 
make the core somewhat reliant on the economic well being in the periphery, the in-
terdependence is fundamentally skewed, as the periphery is very reliant on a contin-
ued inflow of capital to keep servicing their debt. The key to solving these imbalanc-
es, in light of the data shown, will be to restore a more balanced current account be-
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tween the core and the periphery. In order to do so, the Eurozone faces a monumental 
challenge. 
The role of competitiveness 
As shown, in Spain and Ireland a large portion of the cheap credit was funnelled into 
real estate, increasing house prices significantly more than the average in the Euro-
zone. What Spain and Ireland has in common with Portugal and Greece is that, while 
they re-invested the foreign funds they did not do so in areas, which could enhance 
their competitiveness. On the contrary, as the bubble in real estate was building, wag-
es and prices in the periphery increased significantly relative to the core, having a 
profound negative effect on their competitiveness (Krugman, 2012: p. 180). 
 
One measure of competitiveness is Unit Labour Cost (ULC). ULC is labour remuner-
ation divided by real output, or, in other words the nominal cost of labour relative to 
labour productivity adjusted for the exchange rate (Lapavitsas, 2012: pp. 24-25). 
 
Figure 12 
Figure 12 illustrates one of the components of the ULC, namely workers compensa-
tion. Price inflation in the periphery has risen alongside the wage increase, but at a 
slower pace, meaning that real compensation has increased more in the periphery than 
in the core, except for in Spain and Italy. (Lapavitsas, 2012: pp. 25-27). 
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Figure 13 
The other part of the ULC, as mentioned, is productivity. Labour productivity was 
rising at a faster pace in most peripheral countries than in Germany; however, it was 
not rising rapidly enough to catch up with the German productivity level relative to 
wages (Lapavitsas, 2012: pp. 26-28). As illustrated in Figure 13, the productivity in-
creases in the periphery were only slightly lower than the core average, with Spain 
being the main force pulling it backwards. 
 
As the ULC is a combination of wages, productivity and the exchange rate, with the 
latter being removed from the equation, in this instance due to the common currency, 
the sentiment is quite simple. When increasing wages is not offset by an equal or 
higher increase in productivity, a countries competitive position will deteriorate, espe-
cially if this trend persists over a prolonged period of time. In this instance, the 
growth in wages in the periphery has not been offset by productivity increases, which 
will be reflected in the final ULC. Whether this is explained by too much wage re-
strain in the core, too little restrain in the periphery or lacking productivity increases 
in the periphery is of course relevant. Lapavitsas (2012), argue it is due to excessive 
wage restrain, whereas Higgins & Klitgaard (2011) blames the lack of productivity 
enhancing investments with the inflow of capital. 
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Figure 14 
No matter what the reason is, it has resulted in comparatively poor competitiveness in 
the periphery, as illustrated in the nominal ULC shown in Figure 14. As is evident, 
Germany has succeeded, primarily due to wage restraint, in keeping their ULC and 
therefore competitiveness at a somewhat constant level for most of the build up to the 
crisis, and has benefited by reaping large current account surpluses as a result. 
Sub-conclusion 
If the Eurozone hope to regain market confidence and subsequent easier access to 
credit in the periphery, the large competitive differences must be dealt with. By de-
constructing the ULC it is clear that this can be done in different ways - either by rais-
ing the wage- and price inflation in the core countries or by decreasing the same pa-
rameters in the periphery (Krugman, 2012: pp. 181). This is emphasized by the fact 
that the third parameter of increasing competitiveness, namely devaluating the curren-
cy, is not possible due to the shared currency. 
The most important argument in this chapter is that underlying macro-economic im-
balances persist between the core and the periphery countries in the Eurosone. These 
imbalances have accumulated throughout the build-up of the crisis, leaving the private 
sector of the periphery indebted to the core in the process while the overall competi-
tiveness have deteriorated steadily. In order to reach the target of “(…) balanced eco-
nomic growth (…) full employment and social progress (…)” (TEU, Article 3,(3)), 
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these imbalances need solving. There are two basic ways of doing this: Increasing the 
competitiveness in the periphery relative to the core, or decreasing competitiveness of 
the core relative to the periphery. As the ECB (according to its mandate in TFEU 127) 
must contribute to the achievement of the objectives in TEU 3, the ECB must 
acknowledge the imbalances and take them into account when designing and execut-
ing its measures. 
4.(Analysis(of(the(ECB’s(response(to(the(macroeconomic(imK
balances(
 
This next chapter will contain the analysis of the different measures taken by the ECB 
in response to the economic crisis related to the macroeconomic imbalances in the 
Euro Area. The response of the ECB can be divided into the normal measures, such as 
use of the normal monetary policy instruments as described in the first chapter of this 
report, and non-standard measures, which goes beyond those. These include the pur-
chase of sovereign bonds, the use of the ESM as well as the establishment of new 
tasks related to the pending banking union. 
When looking at the measures carried out by the ECB, it is important to remember 
that the primary mandate afforded to it is that of price stability. Furthermore, the Gov-
erning Board of the ECB has been forced to act parallel to the development of the 
crisis as it happened and did not have the luxury of hindsight when deciding its ac-
tions. The first section is a brief account of the initial actions taken by the ECB in the 
initial stages of the crisis, namely the financial turmoil from 2007-2008 and subse-
quent full-blown financial crisis of 2008-2010. The next section will then examine the 
measures taken during the sovereign debt crisis from 2010 and forth.  
The ECB: Navigating the liquidity crisis 2007-2010 
Within the mandate afforded to the central bank, it has played an active role in the 
financial- and current sovereign debt crisis sweeping across the Eurozone. The crisis 
can roughly be split into two distinct phases, first of which was the financial crisis 
showing itself in late 2007 only to transform into a full-blown financial crisis the fol-
lowing year with the collapse of the American investment bank Lehmann Brothers. In 
April 2010 Greece applied for a € 45bn loan from the EU and the IMF marking the 
transition into a combined financial- and sovereign debt crisis. (Smith, 2010) Shortly 
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after the application the American credit-rating agency Standard & Poor’s downgrad-
ed Greek bonds to ‘junk’-status as Greece faced interest rates of 14pct. short-term 
funding to repay foreign investors more than € 9bn and the political instability facing 
the country. (Wachman & Fletcher, 2010; Kell, 2010) 
 
Figure 15 
Long before the Greek application for a loan and subsequent credit rating downgrade 
the ECB became aware of the ‘turmoil’ in the financial markets. In late August of 
2007 short-term money market rates and spreads started surging, threatening to create 
a liquidity squeeze (Trichet, 2010, p. 8). The ECB primarily saw the financial crisis as 
a crisis of confidence between financial institutions, explaining why its initial re-
sponse was to provide liquidity denominated in Euro in overnight funding to alleviate 
the stress to short-term funding facing the financial system (Trichet, 2010: pp. 8-9). 
At this point in time, as illustrated in Figure 15, government bonds within the Euro-
zone were still perceived to be relatively safe by the markets, as the spreads did not 
begin to increase until late 2009/early 2010. Later in 2007 the ECB increased the ma-
turity of its refinancing operations and expanded it to include US$ liquidity against €-
denominated collateral as the Eurozone was now also facing a liquidity shortage in 
USD (Trichet, 2010: p.9). Essentially, the ECB responded to a liquidity shortage, both 
in € and US$ by expanding the scope of its operations beyond the key interest rate and 
other instruments described in the theoretical chapter. Once again the refinancing op-
erations were limited to the banking system, as the crisis were perceived to primarily 
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be a loss of confidence within the financial sector. The simple solution was to force 
the short-term refinancing interest rates within the financial sector downwards and 
avoid a freeze in interbank lending. 
 
Less than a year later, in 2008, the financial crisis started to unfold. Storied American 
financial institutions started to show signs of weakness with Merrill Lynch being sold 
to Bank of America, Lehmann Brothers filing for Bankruptcy and insurance giant 
American International Group (A.I.G.) seeking substantial amounts of credit from the 
Federal Reserve due to subprime exposure (Sorkin, 2008). The interbank market vir-
tually collapsed due to a sudden and drastic increase in perceived liquidity risk and 
counterparty risk sending credit spreads surging. Financial institutions were scram-
bling to liquidise assets and deleverage their balance sheets further squeezing the 
money markets. The ECB responded by cutting the interest rate by 325 basis points 
the following seven months, landing the main refinancing rate at just 1 per cent hop-
ing to address the disorderly deleveraging causing asset values to plummet (Trichet, 
2010, pp. 10-11). However, as the money markets were preoccupied with shedding 
risk and deleveraging and were thusly highly dysfunctional the cut in interest rates 
proved insufficient, as the lower interest rate were not properly transmitted through 
the markets. (Trichet, 2010, p. 11) The monetary transmission mechanism was break-
ing down, rendering the measures taken inefficient at best and useless at worst, which 
called for further action. The ECB initiated a number of ‘non-standard’ measures to 
better accommodate the volatile environment in the markets. 
 
The ECB began to provide unlimited central bank liquidity to European central banks 
in order to support the troubled short term funding; it also expanded the list of accept-
ed collateral, again, in order to ease access to liquidity. Thirdly, it began utilising 
Long-term Refinancing Operations2 (LTRO) with a maximum maturity of 1 year, 
primarily to alleviate the need to continuously roll over debt and thusly lower the need 
for short-term financing, again with the aim of reducing disorderly deleveraging. 
Fourthly the ECB continued to provide liquidity denominated in USD to help Europe-
an banks with large exposure in USA. Finally, and quite drastically, it began to pur-
                                                2!LTROs are refinancing operations with a longer maturity (1 month to 3 years) than the main refinanc-
ing operations, which typically matures in 1 week or less.!
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chase euro-denominated bonds issued in the Eurozone. Banks use the bonds primarily 
to finance loans in connection with real estate transactions to both private and public 
actors. The total size of the intervention was ~€ 60bn or 2,5pct. of the total market 
(Trichet, 2010: pp. 12-13). 
From financial- to sovereign debt crisis 
The measures taken by the ECB during the period of financial turmoil clearly show 
that it still perceived the crisis to be a crisis primarily of confidence in the financial 
system sparking a need for easier access to liquidity. Even though some of the opera-
tions were ‘non-standard’, aimed at the private banking sector, and all had the ulti-
mate aim of easing access to liquidity to alleviate the stress created by the massive 
loss of confidence. Furthermore, the monetary transmission mechanism was already 
showing signs of weakness, as rapid deleveraging in combination with hoarding of 
capital prevented the decrease in the main refinancing rate from taking effect through 
the regular channels.  
As illustrated in Figure 8, the flow of funds from the core to the periphery continued, 
even as the interbank market came under stress during the period of financial turmoil. 
The initial trouble did indeed seem to be isolated to the financial sector, as spreads on 
government bonds did not begin to increase until 2010, which can explain the initial 
reaction of the ECB. When the financial crisis finally did spill over to the real econo-
my sparking the sovereign debt crisis, the measures initially utilised proved inefficient 
and the ECB had to act accordingly.  
ECB’s non-standard measures in the sovereign debt crisis 
The following chapter explains the Open Market Operations (OMO) and non-standard 
measures of the ECB. We will assess the general developments in the economy by 
monitoring indicators such as inflation, growth rates and the Purchasing Managing 
Index (PMI), which indicates private business activity in relation to the ECB interest 
rate. The chapter will also focus on the development in liquidity demand from banks. 
This will be achieved by analysing the Main Refinancing Operations (MRO), the 
Long-term Refinancing Operations (LTRO), Securities Market Program (SMP), Cov-
ered Bonds Purchasing Program (CBPP) and the Outright Monetary Transaction 
(OMT) program in order to describe the ECBs response to the money market unrest 
and the problematic developments in monetary policy transmission year for year.  
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Banks,(financial(markets(and(the(transmission(of(monetary(policy(
In basic macroeconomic models we assume that private businesses finance their in-
vestments by borrowing from households and the companies then return the profits by 
distributing dividend back to the shareholders. In reality firms finance their invest-
ments from a variety of channels by issuing shares, reinvestment of profits and bor-
rowing from financial institutions. In the real economy households do not lend to 
firms as much as they deposit their savings in banks, the banks then lends to, and in-
vest in, the private businesses (Gottfries, 2013). This is practical for a number of rea-
sons: 
- It will be extremely difficult for larger firms to obtain sufficiently large funds 
from private investors continuously. It would also be extremely time consuming 
to raise the funds from many smaller private investors. Here the financial system 
acts as a financial intermediary by simplifying the path to new capital (Gottfries, 
2013).  
- Financial intermediaries pools savings and channel them to investors. Under 
normal circumstances this creates stability because the risk is spread out over 
many investments, if one investment fails there are ten good investments to cover 
that loss. In this manor the financial system creates security for household savings 
and makes investment capital available to firms. Furthermore, bank employees 
should have more information and experience in judging the potential risks of an 
investment than regular citizens, hence adding to the level of stability even more. 
However history has shown us that they can also be a source of instability due to 
the central function they hold in the economic. (Gottfries, 2013) 
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Figure 16 
As presented in Figure 16 European firms and businesses rely heavily on Bank fund-
ing. The figure compares the share of funding of the non-financial corporate sector in 
the Euro Area and the US to emphasise the importance of banks in the Euro Area. If 
banks are unwilling to provide funding for new investments the European growth 
stagnates. Therefore, a well-functioning banking system is pivotal in the monetary 
policy transmission. If banks do not follow the lead of the Central Bank, the Central 
Bank becomes unable to control consumption and investment and consequently loses 
control over price inflation (Jimborean, 2009). 
 
In 2010, when the sovereign debt crisis was unfolding, government bond markets be-
came increasingly volatile particularly in Greece, Ireland and later Italy, Spain and 
Portugal. This drove the price of both rolling over debt and funding further govern-
ment spending through the roof and subsequently sent the value/price of sovereign 
bonds plummeting for the aforementioned member-states. This had a very unfortunate 
effect on an already severely shaken financial system because government bonds have 
direct effect on the balance sheet, assets and thereby the leverage and real collateral of 
the financial system. 
In this way government bonds are essential to the efficiency and singleness of the 
monetary transaction mechanism in the Eurozone and the ECB came under increasing 
pressure to address the issue (ECB, 2010).  
 
Funding of the non-financial corporate sector in 
the Euro Area (Left) and the US (Right) 
Source: Cour-Thimann & Winkler, 2012: p. 769 
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There are three channels through which government bonds can affect the monetary 
policy transmission in the Eurozone, the price channel, the balance sheet channel and 
the liquidity channel. !
The!price!channel!
First of all the interest rate on government bonds is one of the main factors when cred-
itors assess the risk/the interest rate at which financial and non-financial firms can 
borrow. In this manner, the low short-term interest rate of the ECB is disturbed by the 
high government bond yields thereby forcing interest rates in the opposite direction.  
Hence the monetary policies are interrupted in their way through the transmission 
mechanism and end up in liquidity hampering banks or investments in a safer envi-
ronment, leaving government debt levels to rise even more creating a destructive spi-
ral for both firms and citizens. Therefore the central bank loses its ability to control 
the price of borrowing (ECB, 2011, p. 19). 
The!balance!sheet!channel!
The second effect is that, not only are the banks not investing, their balance sheets are 
being chopped away under their feet as the bonds continue to flood the market. The 
price of the bonds plummet and so does the solvency of banks making the risk of 
lending operation considerably larger and hence their lending operations smaller. The 
exact opposite of what you want in a period of poor economic performance (ECB, 
2011, p.20).     
The!liquidity!channel!
The abnormal low liquidity of government bonds would also cause significant prob-
lems in refinance operations because they no longer represent strong collateral in the 
market, hence hinder the banks’ access to new loans (ECB, 2011, p.21). 
 
After providing this understanding of the various channels through which government 
bonds affect the private banking sector and, through that, the transmission of the cen-
tral bank’s monetary policy, we now turn to assessing the specific monetary policy 
measures of the ECB.  
 !
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Non5standard!times!call!for!non5standard!measures!
As the financial crisis evolved into a sovereign debt crisis through bank bailouts and 
rising unemployment, the ECB saw the need to intervene in the bond markets to de-
crease the negative effects introduced above. The no-bailout clause, article 125 in the 
Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union, prohibits the ECB from directly 
providing liquidity to member states forcing the ECB to launch a temporary interven-
tion program in the securities market to bring up the price of government bonds and 
boost bank assets. The two bond purchasing programs, the SMP and the CBPP, were 
launched in May of 2010 to address the malfunctioning of specific segments of the 
Eurozone debt securities market and government bonds to reopen several vital chan-
nels in the monetary transmission mechanism (Darvas, 2012). As presented in Figure 
16, 80 pct. of all financing is done through bank loans, therefore if the banking system 
stops their lending activities the consumption and investments stops with it. As banks 
traditionally hold large amounts of national government bonds the sovereign debt 
crisis began reducing the solvency of periphery banks. This has several unwelcome 
consequences. 
For these reasons the ECB decided to launch the SMP in an attempt to calm down the 
volatile government bonds market in the periphery and thereby re-establish the mone-
tary transmission by purchasing bonds in the secondary market. The ECB Sovereign 
bond market purchases through the SMP totalled € 73,5bn in 2010 (ECB, 2011). 
  
 43 
Monetary!policy!operation!of!2010!
The ECB’s main refinancing rate remained unchanged through 2010 staying at 1 pct. 
as the inflation rate made a positive climb from the low 0,3 pct. of 2009 to 1,6 pct. on 
average in 2010 (ECB, 2011: p. 201.), 
 
Figure 17 
As presented in Figure 17 a considerable amount of long-term refinancing operations 
matured in June these were mostly one-year LTROs. With the seeming stabilisation of 
demand for ECB liquidity on the horizon, the ECB terminated their one-year LTROs 
and issued only six and three-month LTROs. The daily average outstanding of the 
ECB in LTROs prior to June was € 671bn on average and at the end of the year it was 
down to € 333bn (ECB, 2011). This reflects a less volatile money market and thereby 
a lower demand for ECB liquidity. Furthermore we see that the MROs were boosted 
in a correlational manor but that the overall liquidity need provided by the ECB was 
slightly reduced signalling a return to standard monetary policy circumstances.   
Securities!Market!Programs!and!Covered!Bond!Purchasing!Program!
As the sovereign debt of an increasing number of Eurozone members kept rising, the 
CBPP and the SMP in the primary and secondary market increased accordingly. The 
SMP and CBPP operations provided € 134,8bn by purchasing bonds, (CBPP € 60bn) 
on the primary and (SMP € 74,4bn) on the secondary markets (ECB, 2011). The fall-
ing demand for ECB liquidity operations in the second half of 2010 can be partly as-
signed as an effect of the two government bonds purchasing programs which seem to 
Liquidity Factors in the Euro Area, 2010 
Source: ECB, 2011: p. 94 
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have fulfilled their purpose of boosting balance sheets and thereby easing refinancing 
on the money market. The Purchasing Managing Index (PMI) for the Eurozone gave 
out positive activity numbers rising from 37 points in 2009 to 54 by the end of 2010 
(Ibid) Furthermore the year ended with a positive 2 pct. growth rate on the Eurozone 
average up from -4,4 pct.  in 2009, thereby further heating up the frozen interbank 
market (Ibid), 
 
Monetary policy operations: 2011 
The positive economic development continued into the first quarter of 2011. Accord-
ing to the ECB annual report of 2011 the PMI for February hit a post-crisis high at 58 
points for the Eurozone and 59,4 points globally (ECB,2012).  Unfortunately the fi-
nancial markets became increasingly volatile due to government bond runs and this 
development sharply increased the banking system’s demand for liquidity operations 
from € 600bn in the first half of 2011 to over €1trn by the end of the year (Ibid)  
This was reflected in the amount of excess reserves3 in the banking system reaching € 
2.53bn, which was more than double the amount of 2010 (€ 1.26bn) and 2009 (€ 
1.03bn) emphasising the uncertainty in the market. Furthermore, the use of the ECB’s 
daily deposit facility increased from € 25bn in the first half in 2011 to € 528bn in De-
cember (Ibid). These numbers reflect the increased freezing of the monetary transmis-
sion mechanism. The increase in demand for liquidity in the banking system tells us 
that the interbank market is freezing, which strains the manoeuvrability of banks and 
their willingness to engage in new lending operations to firms and households. This, 
in turn, results in a stagnation of consumption and investment, which ultimately halts 
the growth of the Eurozone economy, confirmed in the massive increase in deposits 
by the banking system in the ECB. 
With this massive build-up of capital in the banking system hampering the monetary 
transmission mechanisms, the ECB introduced a new three-year LTRO thereby 
providing medium term liquidity for pressured banks. Looking at Figure 18 we find 
that the three-year LTROs almost substituted both one-month and three-months 
LTROs thereby calming market insecurity in short-term refinancing. However the 
figure also shows that along with the increase in liquidity operations we see a signifi-
                                                
3 The amount stored in the banks above the min. requirement. 
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cant increase in deposits as well. This tells us that the ECB, despite its low deposit 
rate (0.25 pct.), was still a preferred place to store capital (ECB, 2012)  
 
Looking at Figure 18 we also find that both the SMP and the CBPP programs contin-
ued to increase throughout the second half of the year especially in the securities mar-
ket. This was an attempt to boost the value of government bonds. In comparison to the 
previous year SMP and CBPP activities had expanded from € 136bn. to € 214bn. in 
the attempt to strengthen bank assets and thereby their liquidity (ECB, 2012). 
 
 
Figure 18 
 
Inflation(and(GDP(developments:(
In 2011 the GDP growth rate in the Euro Area kept falling through the second half of 
the year landing at 1,6 pct. while the inflation rate was well above the 2pct. target at 
2,7 pct. (Eurostat, GDP growth, 2013). The ECB increased the interest rate twice by 
0,25 pct. in order to control rising prices, first in April and then in July. Rising infla-
tion and a slowdown in GDP growth would under normal circumstances seem like a 
contradiction. However, the increased inflation may be due to the very high levels of 
Outstanding Volume of Monetary Policy Operations 
Source: ECB, 2012: p. 82 
 46 
liquidity provided through the ECB’s non-standard operations. In the ECB’s own 
words  
“[…] while the monetary analysis indicated that the underlying pace of 
monetary expansion was moderate, monetary liquidity was ample and 
might have facilitated the accommodation of price pressures” (ECB, 
2012: p.15). 
 
The scenario forced the ECB to increase the interest rate even though GDP growth 
levels were falling thereby contributing to the slowdown in the first half of the 2011. 
In Figure 19 we see the developments over the year and that the interest rate was low-
ered back down to the 2010 level of 1 pct.  again at the end of the year.  
 
Figure 19 
Unfortunately the negative developments in GDP growth across the Eurozone kept 
unfolding from having a positive growth of 0,78 pct. in Q1 to -0,22 in Q4. (OECD, 
quarterly GDP growth, 2013) What started off looking like the year Europe might 
ECB Interest rates and the overnight interest rate 
Source: ECB, 2012: p. 14 
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bounce back from the three years in economic distress ended in the largest ECB li-
quidity provision and intervention on the secondary bond markets.   
 
Monetary policy operations 2012 – 2013 
The deteriorating growth rate continued into 2012 and HICP inflation remained over 2 
pct. throughout the year. The elevated inflation was mainly due to rising energy prices 
and increased taxes in certain member states. In the second half of 2012 the ECB cut 
the interest from 1 pct. to 0.75 pct. in a reaction to the stagnated growth and growing 
demand for financial market liquidity. In an attempt to force the liquidity provided 
through the monetary system the ECB deposit rate was also lowered to 0,0 pct. to 
reduce the financial incentive to store the capital at the ECB and thereby improve the 
monetary policy transmission (Cour-thimann, 2013) 
However, the sovereign debt crisis accelerated and the government bond yields went 
through the roof in Greece, Spain, Ireland, Portugal and Italy vastly increasing the 
volatility on the financial markets. In 2011 the balance sheet channel froze along with 
the interbank market hence differentiating the monetary policy impact between mem-
bers. As the market questioned the solvency of financial institutions situated in coun-
tries with large government debt was questioned. Interbank lending to periphery 
banks froze, resulting in increased liquidity demand from the ECB. However, the in-
creased liquidity did not trickle down to households in periphery markets, but was 
used to deleverage and secure solvency in stressed institutions instead. (ECB, 2013) 
The rising liquidity demand in combination with the depreciating value of govern-
ment bonds resulted in a significant LTRO increase in May of 2012.  
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Figure 20 
In mid-2012 it became apparent that the exceptional SMP and CBPP programs could 
not defend government bonds, and bank assets, at the current level of bond market 
distortion. Subsequently Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) replaced the two 
non-standard operations. The OMT program was initiated to close an unforeseen hole 
in the EMU pointed out by both economists, such as de Grauwe (2011), and the mar-
ket itself. A comparison of how sovereign debt impact government bond rates for 
EMU and non-EMU members revealed that, due to the construct of the monetary un-
ion, EMU members cannot guarantee that they would have the liquidity to honour 
their long-term government bonds as they do not hold the competence to print money 
individually. Therefore, in a bond market with serious concerns about whether the 
Euro was retractable, otherwise sustainable debt levels, like the Spanish (86 pct. of 
GDP in 2012), left government bond yields soaring, making it even harder to service 
the current debt, and accumulating even more. To stop this self-fulfilling prophecy the 
OMT was launched as a lender of last resort through secondary market interventions 
(ECB, 2013). In this way, the announcement of the ECB as a lender of last resort 
guarantees that there will always be capital to pay the yield on government bonds 
when the maturity is up, and in this manner, it has a pre-emptive calming effect on the 
bond markets.  
Outstanding Volume of Monetary Policy Operations 
Source: ECB, 2013: p. 80 
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Outright!Monetary!Transactions!
The ECB has committed itself to use the OMT whenever needed, but always from a 
monetary policy perspective and only in the event of market fragmentation: “OMTs 
are aimed at supporting the transmission mechanism in all euro area countries and 
the singleness of the monetary policy”, (ECB, 2013). The announcement of the OMT 
was successful in alleviating some of the market pressure in the second half of 2012 
reflected in the falling government bond yields presented in Figure 21. 
  
 
Figure 21 
The announcement of the OMT has halted a worsening of the sovereign debt crisis 
and has theoretically made sovereign debt less significant, in the eyes of the market 
Japan with its government debt being 200+ pct. of GDP while sustaining a 1 pct. yield 
on its government bonds is a prime example of the importance of a central bank func-
tioning as a lender of last resort (Bloomberg – markets, 2013). According to the ra-
tionale that yields on government bonds largely define the borrowing interest rate of 
the national banking system, we should expect to see a significant increase in market 
financing of periphery banks. 
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 It must be noted that multiple factors such as the balance of payments and the 
strength of the individual economy are the primary factors that define the market trust 
and hence the level of sustainable government debt.  
 
If the reduced yield on government bonds has been successful in improving the mone-
tary transmission mechanism, we should observe a lower demand for liquidity provid-
ed by the ECB and a lower excess reserve. 
The demand for LTROs declined modestly in the second half of 2012 as financial 
market calmed down due to the record amount of liquidity in the market. Furthermore 
the average monthly excess reserves of banks reached a new high of € 4.61bn com-
pared to 2011 (€ 2.53bn) and 2010 (€ 1,26bn). This development was mainly a result 
of the deposit rate being lowered to zero pct., eliminating the incentive to store re-
serves in the ECB, hence liquidity stayed in the banks. However, as the market is al-
ways aiming to optimise its profits the large amount of excess reserves reflects the 
uncertainty of future events was still very much present.  
  
 51 
Kiss and tell – Target2 balance reveals the flow of funds 
In Figure 22 we see the Target2 balance as the crisis evolves where a positive amount 
reflects a net claim of a national central bank and visa versa. The Target2 balances 
tells us which countries have a net surplus of liquidity and who has a net deficit and it 
gives us several pieces of information. 
 
Figure 22 
First up, we can identify which banking systems cannot finance their operation in the 
open market. Not surprisingly it is Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Italy and Cyprus.  
 
Secondly, it shows that the majority of the liquidity provided through the LTRO, 
MRO, SMP and CBPP operations has flowed largely from the ECB, via the NCBs, to 
the countries that desperately need new investments to revitalise their economies and 
re-establish the monetary policy transmission. However, the figure also reveals that 
the liquidity provided has been reinvested in the German banking sector, represented 
by the large net claim of the Bundesbank (Cour-Thimann, 2013). The reason for this 
is that the German economy is currently the strongest and perceived as the safest 
place to store the reserves and as explained, investors seek safety over returns in dire 
times. In December of this year Mario Draghi recognised this and said that, ”If we do 
The Rise of Target Balances During the Crisis 
Source: Cour-Thimann, 2013: p. 11 
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new operation similar to LTRO, we want to make sure it’s used for the economy […] 
not subsidising capital provision by the banking system for these carry-trade opera-
tion.” (Jones, 2013). 
 
Thirdly, the continuous rise in Target2 imbalances tells us that, despite the efforts, the 
ECB has been unable to re-open the interbank market with the use of LTROs, SMPs 
and CBPP operations, and reveal the member states with the highest perceived finan-
cial risk and thereby instability (Cour-Thimann, 2013).  
Fourthly, because banks are international in life but national in death, domestic fac-
tors, such as government debt, are very influential in a crisis and therefore also on the 
transmission mechanism.  
 
However, the introduction of the ECB as a lender of last resort with the OMT pro-
gram and the reassurance from the president of the ECB, Mario Draghi, that he is 
ready to do “whatever it takes” (Draghi, 2012), in combination with operations of the 
European Stability Mechanism, have brought liquidity demands down to 2011 level.  
But the decline from a historic high Target2 imbalance can hardly be interpreted as a 
resolution of the monetary transmission mechanism in general. Currently the primary 
focus of the ECB is the re-establish the singleness of the monetary policy transmis-
sion, and for good reasons.  
The Current Outlook  
Looking at the General economic indications, inflation, GDP growth, PMI and unem-
ployment macroeconomic improvements have stagnated across the board.  
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Figure 23 
As presented in Figure 23 inflation fell below the 2 pct. target in January already and 
despite a reduction in the MFI in both February (to 0,5 pct.) and November (to 0,25 
pct.), the ECB was unable to deliver on its mandate. The GDP Growth rate in the Eu-
rozone for 2013 is currently predicted to be -0,4 pct. (Eurostat – Real GDP Growth 
Rate), which is also reflected in the PMI number being unchanged from 2012 at 50 
points (see annex 1). Improvements in the monetary transmission mechanism appear 
unlikely for the foreseeable future.  
SubKconclusion(
 
Even though both sovereign bonds and the Target2 balance have improved after the 
introduction of the OMT program, it is evident from the material presented, that the 
ECB liquidity is still much needed and that the interbank market continues to be fro-
zen between core and periphery banking systems. Furthermore we can conclude that 
the monetary policy transmission mechanism in the Eurozone is very sensitive to 
market confidence and interbank lending. Providing liquidity alone has not solved the 
monetary transmission as the sovereign debt crisis showed us the interconnectedness 
between the availability of interbank market liquidity and macroeconomic imbalances 
between Eurozone members. The loss of monetary transmission is well reflected in 
the failed effort of the ECB to reach target inflation of 2 pct. in 2013 and possibly the 
years to come. Even with the historically low short-term interest rate, neither inflation 
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nor GDP growth is on the horizon and the threat of deflation is lurking in the shad-
ows. Such an economic picture does not bode well for the struggling EMU members 
in the south already experiencing declining GDP growth (Greece, Spain, Cyprus, Por-
tugal and Italy) and it does not spur market confidence either. With the current level 
of interdependence between public finances and the financial system, the differentiat-
ed monetary transmission is dependent on the improvement of the macroeconomic 
imbalances of the Eurozone as well as the separation of government finances and per-
ceived soundness of the banking sector.  
The European Stability Mechanism  
As described in the section on optimum currency areas, fiscal integration is an integral 
part of such an area, and the ESM can potentially play such a role, albeit in a very 
limited scope. Essentially, we want to provide a short overview of the mechanism, 
seeing as it is an important part of addressing the sovereign debt crisis and most of the 
funds have been channelled to the banking sectors in the receiving countries. The also 
ECB plays an important role in shaping the conditionality imposed on the countries 
requesting funds, making the ESM part of the new competences conferred to the 
ECB, albeit in a very limited way. Furthermore, as we will present later, sovereign 
debt is linked to the limited access to finance in the periphery. As it stands the ESM is 
the primary institution in the EU to address severely distressed public government 
finances.  
The Stability Mechanism and Optimum Currency Area 
As explained in the OCA chapter, the ideal monetary union consists of both a transfer 
of monetary policy and fiscal policy from the sovereign states to a centralised supra-
national institution. The EU does not have a fiscal union but have certain parameters 
in place that curtail fiscal autonomy, reducing the ability of states to conduct an inde-
pendent fiscal policy: 
• A max inflation level of 1,5 pct. on the HICP 
• Government deficit must not exceed 3 pct. 
• Government debt level at a maximum level of 60pct. 
• The long-term interest rate must not exceed 2 pct. compared with the three 
member states showing lowest inflation on the HICP. 
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These are the fiscals constrains attached to the EMU, and as long as they are adhered 
to, the ECB cannot call for new legislation on the fiscal area. With these guidelines, 
and article 123, 124 and 125 of TFEU it was further defined that the ECB (or a na-
tional central bank) could not provide an overdraft facility or provide other types of 
credit facility for other member states. It is also the member states’ own responsibility 
to comply with the criteria in the SGP and Fiscal Compact, and the ECB or members 
of the Eurozone are not liable for any commitments made by another member state. 
This is the so called “no bailout clause” and this leaves the member states on their 
own in regard of public finances. For the member states, this means that they have to 
finance themselves under conditions set by the market, exposing them to judgement on their 
financial health by the markets. (J.V. Louis 2010. P.978). 
 
This was how the EU functioned up until the crisis. The crisis showed that sanctions 
imposed by the market can have an excessive and almost instantaneously impact 
(ibid.). The problem for the sovereign states is that financial markets do not always 
act in the best interest of society, as seen in Spain with the housing bubble, and this 
can cause trouble triggering societal instability. It is the purpose of a national fiscal 
policy to even out these effects by controlling demand. It should do so by imposing 
higher taxes in growth times, and in bad times, it should lower its taxes in order to 
spur investment and thereby decreasing unemployment (Jesper Jespersen, 2012). It is 
in this context the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and later The Europe-
an Stability Mechanism (ESM) was made, as an enhanced and permanent version of 
its predecessor, the EFSF. It functions as a last resort fund for financially distressed 
member states from where they can borrow capital when the market refuses to pro-
vide it on sustainable terms in order to avoid default. The creation of ESM became 
possible by an amendment to article 136 in the TFEU stating that: 
 
"The Member States whose currency is the euro may establish a stability mechanism 
to be activated if indispensable to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole. 
The granting of any required financial assistance under the mechanism will be made 
subject to strict conditionality." (European Council, 2011) 
 
This made way for the creation of a permanent stability mechanism, the ESM, which 
is an intergovernmental institution formed under international law. The ESM treaty 
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was signed by the 17 member states of the Eurozone in September 2012. The reason 
that the ESM was formed as an intergovernmental institution was due to the no 
bailout clause, which prohibits the EU and the ECB from directly financially assisting 
a member state. A member state can apply for financial support from the ESM if it 
does not meet the conditions given by the by the Protocol on the Excessive Deficit 
Procedure (EDP), and its financial situation calls for an intervention. The financial 
assistance can be granted on two conditions, one if the distressed member states are 
dealing with a government debt level and government deficit, which could be of such 
a magnitude that it would be a danger for the Eurozone as whole. Second, it may be 
decided to grant financial assistance with the aim of re-capitalising the financial insti-
tution of the member state (TEESM, 2012, Article 15). The financial assistance, as 
defined in the treaty amendment, must entail strict conditionality (ESM – about ESM; 
TFEU, article 136). The matter of defining the strict conditionality is in the hands of 
the European Commission in liaison with the ECB and the IMF (commonly referred 
to as the Troika) and is defined in a memorandum of understanding (MoU) and a Fi-
nancial assistance Facility Agreement (FFA) specifically designed for each case 
(TEESM, 2012, Article 13; Stratigopoulou & Mylonakis, 2013, p.18).  
The ECB is thusly an important actor in forming the macroeconomic adjustment pro-
grams necessarily following ESM assistance. Through the ESM, the ECB can influ-
ence the specific design of the adjustment programme and thereby try to impose im-
provements necessary to the objectives of the ECB, namely monetary policy. 
 
The FFA determines the size and sets up the judicial framework of the financial assis-
tance, while the MoU broadly defines the macro-economic adjustment programs. It 
was evident in the case of Spain, that the financial assistance is treated as sovereign 
debt, in other words a loan. By the FFA it was further defined in which direction the 
financial assistance were to be directed. The sector found to have caused the crisis in 
Spain was the banking sector. The macro-economic adjustments described in the 
MoU had comprehensive fiscal impact in Spain, with the aim of bringing them back 
on terms with the EDP/SGP criteria (Etzerodt, Hoff & Sørensen, 2013, p. 54). As 
Spain had seen an increase in unemployment, from 8,5 pct. in 2006 to a level of 
25pct. in 2012, the expenditure for the state had increased. Therefore, Spain had to 
correct its taxation system, along with its fiscal policies to support growth (ibid.). 
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It is evident through the case of Spain, that the EMU lacks a fiscal system to support 
the objectives in TEU article 3. The fiscal measures that the ESM impose are only 
partially formed by the ECB, and can only be effectuated in cases were member states 
are already in distress, and with their approval. The ESM solution can be interpreted 
as a response driven institution, and not a preventive one, seeing as it cannot step in 
until a country is in irreversible distress and actually requests funding. On the other 
hand, you cannot obtain help via the OMT without taking part in a readjustment pro-
gramme designed in relation to financial assistance from the ESM, and, as we have 
seen in Spain, being under ESM conservatorship is not necessarily a comfortable ride. 
Indirectly the strict conditionality should keep member states from applying for assis-
tance, as the dictated terms are very tough.   
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Assessing the perspectives of the Banking Union 
As a consequence of the financial crisis, and as a bulwark against the like in the fu-
ture, it has been decided to finally supplement the EMU with a banking union and 
hereby complement the economic union with a political regulation measure towards 
the European financial markets. 
While before, as the monetary policy in the EMU was the task of a central institution, 
namely the ECB, the supervision of banks was still kept as a task of the respective 
member states’ authorities. The principle of home country control and host country 
responsibility (de Grauwe 2009: 184) meant that it was the national authorities who 
were responsible for supervising their own national banks, and those banks’ foreign 
branches, while the host member state was also responsible for financial stability in its 
own domestic market (ibid). 
Modern banks increasingly operate across borders; hence, there is a need for national 
authorities to have access to information on the banks operating in their turf, in order 
to ensure financial stability, regardless of the location of the banks’ head office. The 
fact then, that other authorities holds the necessary supervision information, is a major 
obstacle in the task, of securing financial stability. 
The lack of supervision related to the problem has allowed the European commercial 
banks to expand their balance sheets by increasing their lending up until the crisis (de 
Grauwe 2009: 186). And without necessarily being able to respond to a sudden with-
drawal of capital, because of illiquid asset holding as reserves (ct. reserve ratio-
section), this lead to a liquidity crisis. 
 
In the coming sections we will investigate further, whether or not the shortages in 
coordination and integration persist in the current framework and have had negative 
impacts on the current financial crisis. In our look at the current framework we outline 
some of the most pressing issues that the Banking Union must address in order to ful-
fil its objective. Lastly we look at the proposed and adopted regulations in relation to 
the Banking Union to discuss whether or not it will be capable of addressing the dif-
ferentiated monetary transmission and restore financial stability across the entire Euro 
Area both in the short and long run.    
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Government finance matters 
The banking sector is supposed to, through lending to firms and households, spur in-
vestments, which can enable growth and thereby amount in revenue of which taxes 
must be paid back to the government. Unfortunately the governments in the Euro Ar-
ea have been lacking these revenues and have had enormous expenses related to the 
refinancing of their respective banking sectors in the beginning of the crisis. At the 
same time the Euro Areas’ periphery governments have been unable to sell bonds to 
the distressed commercial banks at sustainable rates, rendering them unable to sustain 
their deficits. There has been a vicious circle between the banking sector and the sov-
ereign debt crisis (Verhelst, 2012: p. 3). 
The circle goes back from the governments’ budget to the banking sector again. Be-
cause while the governments had to mind their deficit and impose austerity measures, 
this has again affected growth prospects negatively, which hit the banking sector 
again. The governments’ budget deficit also affected their domestic banking sector’s 
credibility and solvency because of doubts on the ability of their governments to res-
cue them.  Finally, the market value of the government bonds decreased as doubts 
surrounding their ability to turn their budgets around and repay the debt surfaced. The 
banks holding these debts as assets suffered as well (Verhelst 2012: p. 3) 
 
As the financial sector plays a central role in distributing credit, the current situation 
where banks, primarily due to the geographical location of its headquarter, cannot 
obtain funding without paying large premiums is problematic (Sapir & Wolff, 2013).  
 
The(importance(of(credit(for(businesses(
Small to medium size enterprises (SMEs) account for 95 pct. of all businesses in the 
EU and 60-70 pct. of all employment in OECD countries and are therefore vital for 
any general economy of the Eurozone (OECD, 2000).  
The small to medium size enterprises (SMEs) are particularly reliant on a continued 
lending willingness to invest in future growth or just to keep their heads above water 
in times of crisis. According to the European Commission (2013: p. 9) 21 pct. of the 
SMEs in the EU had applied for a bank loan in the past six months emphasising the 
importance of being able to obtain a loan on reasonable terms. Unfortunately the will-
ingness from both domestic (internal) and international (external) banks is vastly dif-
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ferentiated between Eurozone members making the possible marginal profit from new 
investments coincidently smaller or larger depending solely on the geographical loca-
tion of the SME in question. Especially small SMEs experienced increasing interest 
rates in 2013 where 38 pct. of the SMEs saw their potential profits decrease. (Com-
mission, access to finance survey, 2013)  
The differentiated access to finance in the Eurozone was significant in 2013 where the 
European Commission (2013: p. 15) recorded that 40 pct. of SMEs in Cyprus, 32 pct. 
in Greece, 23 pct. in Spain and 20 pct. in Italy had restrictions of funds. As illustrated 
in Figure 24 that SMEs in countries with a relatively large sovereign debt find it hard-
est to obtain finances in the banking system and have the lowest GDP growth rates.  
 
Figure 24 
As we established in the previous chapter the value of government bond directly af-
fects the interbank market rate for banks in that country and that sovereign debt levels 
matter in times of financial turmoil due to the differentiated amount of national 
bailout potential and contracting value of assets. Therefore the sovereign debt has an 
indirect effect on the access to finance and it is an important factor in the current 
structure of the monetary transmission mechanism in the Eurozone.  
The banking union can contribute to the separation of perceived government- and 
private risk. If the public economy risks are separated from the private banking sys-
tem risks the effect high sovereign debt has on the monetary transmission mechanism 
could be significantly lower. 
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The role of the Banking union is multi-faceted. It aims to remove doubt on whether 
national supervision authorities are being honest about the state of their respective 
banking sectors. The SRM, with the resolution fund will transfer the expenses of the 
distressed banks away from the governments’ budget and onto the banking sector it-
self, hopefully cutting the tie between sovereign debt and domestic financial institu-
tions. The exposure to problem banks needs to be pooled at the European level, em-
phasising the separation of multinational banks and their national government, which 
is part of the rationale for organising the bank supervision at the European level as 
well. The overall goal is to keep the taxpayers away from paying the bill for failed 
banks again (Allen et al., 2012: p.113). 
 
The question and subject for analysis in this chapter is whether the set-up of the bank-
ing union, with its two pillars: the SSM and the SRM will in fact be able to fulfil its 
goals. How will the centralised supervision under the ECB be of any difference than 
the national supervision? How will the costs of the private financial sectors mistakes 
be channelled away from governments’ budgets and onto the banks themselves and 
thereby break the vicious circle? How will the banking union contribute to the mend-
ing of the broken monetary policy transmission caused by the fragmented European 
banking sector? 
 
The problem described above can be reduced to the observation that, up until now at 
least, banks have been international in life and national in death. Essentially, financial 
institutions expand their balance sheets to include assets from all across the world, but 
are supervised in their country of origin. Furthermore, as their operations stem from 
the country of origin it is, in the last instance, up to that respective government or su-
pervisor to decide whether to do a bail out or let the bank fail if it finds itself in an 
irreversibly bad position (Beck et. al, 2013). 
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Figure 25 
As shown in Figure 25, there can be no doubt that banks in the Eurozone has been, 
and indeed persist to be, heavily interconnected. The data only include foreign claims, 
meaning that domestic claims are of course not included (e.g. German bank exposure 
within Germany is not part of the Core to Core category). The figure indeed shows 
that the exposure does not even appear to be contained within regions as core expo-
sure to the periphery rose above core exposure to the core in the period leading up to, 
and even in the beginning of, the crisis.  
Making the case for the separation of Banks & State 
Even in the current framework, where the troubled countries have found themselves 
on the receiving end of financial assistance from IMF and EU-institutions, the public 
budgets do still matter. As we will show here, even if they receive international help, 
it is still ultimately the general government who is responsible for repaying the finan-
cial assistance with great costs to the taxpayer and the general public good of the 
country. Essentially, banks are still national in death.  
 
To emphasise the point that banks are national in death, one needs to look no further 
than the wide-ranging deposit guarantee issued by the Irish government to Irish banks 
when the crisis unfolded in 2008. The Irish government issued the guarantee in re-
sponse to the sudden freeze in the interbank market, leaving the banking sector unable 
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to roll over short-term debt and was estimated to cover € 400bn of liabilities (Murray-
Brown & Dennis, 2008). To put the amount into context, the Irish GDP in 2008 was 
~€ 180,3bn, making the guarantee ~220 pct. of total GDP that year (Eurostat – Annual 
National Accounts) Whereas a guarantee on pretty much all deposits, including inter-
bank deposits, does not necessarily turn into losses, the government surplus of 2,9 
pct./GDP was converted to a deficit of 30,6 pct./GDP in 2010 necessitating financial 
assistance totalling up to € 85bn in 2010 by a joint programme facilitated by EFSM, 
EFSF and IMF. (Eurostat – Government deficit/surplus, debt and associated data; 
European Commission – Economic Adjustment Programme for Ireland) Of the total 
amount € 35bn were designated to suffering Irish banks and the rest to help the Gov-
ernment service its rising debt-levels.  
The story is much the same in Spain, who received financial assistance of up to € 
100bn from the ESM in 2012. Most of the money was channelled to the so-called 
FROB4, which is essentially a fund aimed at orderly recapitalisation of the Spanish 
banking sector. (ESM – Financial Assistance) 
 
Common for both of the aforementioned cases is, that the burden of repayment ulti-
mately falls on the government, seeing as the repayment of the financial assistance is 
to be serviced as general government debt (Etzerodt, Hoff & Sørensen, 2013; Irish 
FFA, Article 5(2)). This raises the question if relatively small countries, like Ireland, 
and even larger ones, like Spain, can really sustain a large multi-national banking sec-
tor. After all, foreign assets make up a large part of many large banks’ balance sheets. 
In Santander, a Spanish bank, the percentage of foreign assets was 64 pct. in 2011, for 
Deutsche Bank the corresponding percentage was 82 in the same year (Beck et.al, 
2013). 
 
Another important point to this aside from the fact, that the economies of the different 
smaller countries may not be able to sustain losses on the scale required by a large 
multi-national banking sector is that the regulatory framework may favour banks pri-
marily engaged in domestic business. Beck et.al (2013) note that incentives for na-
tional regulators are distorted. Their conclusion is that, the larger the share of foreign 
assets and deposits, the less likely a timely intervention from the regulators in their 
                                                
4$The$Fund$for$Orderly$Bank$Restructuring$$
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country of origin. The incentive causing this behaviour is quite straight forward, as 
the failure of a bank with its primary operation outside the borders of the country of 
origin will impose the largest costs on its foreign stakeholders. Conversely, this may 
decrease the overall welfare, especially when the banking system is as intertwined as 
that of the Eurozone. Also, this tendency to favour your domestic banking sector may 
have led to bailouts or state guarantees of banks that may not have been systemically 
important from a stability perspective (Véron, 2013) 
 
If you accept that national regulators are poorly equipped to efficiently deal with large 
multi-national banks both due to their size and the skewed incentives as described 
above, the current framework within the EU with the national governments tasked 
with sustaining financial stability is severely challenged during times of crisis, which 
makes a strong case for centralising the supervision and resolution. The banking un-
ion will achieve this. 
 
Schoenmaker (2011) try to model this problem with inspiration from the monetary 
trilemma presented in our theoretical chapter. He argues that financial stability, finan-
cial integration and national financial policy is inherently incompatible and that one 
has to give. Just as, under capital mobility and national monetary policy, fixed ex-
change rates will break down, financial stability will invariably break if the banking 
system is largely international and regulation of financial institutions remain national. 
The argument follows the logic presented by Beck et.al (2013), namely that national 
supervisors are prone to intervene in a timely fashion only if the domestic benefits 
outweigh the costs, and thereby tend to ignore the external costs resulting in a failure 
to intervene. In essence, as financial integration increase, the effectiveness of national 
policy decreases. (Schoenmaker, 2011: p. 4) This can both be due to the skewed in-
centives already shown, but also due to poor co-ordination between regulators from 
different countries, and thereby, possibly, with contrary interests. Following this log-
ic, the important determinant as to the efficiency of the current regulatory framework 
must be the degree to which the banking system of the Eurozone is international in its 
operations. We have already shown that the banking system of the core and the pe-
riphery is clearly interdependent (Figure 25). The following table puts the internation-
alisation of the European banking sector in international context.  
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Geographical(Spread(of(Banking(Sector(by(continent(
( 2006! 2009!
( Domestic! Regional! World! Domestic! Regional! World!
Europe( 52pct.! 23pct.! 25pct.! 52pct.! 22pct.! 26pct.!
America( 78pct.! 8pct.! 14pct.! 72pct.! 7pct.! 21pct.!
AsiaKPacific( 82pct.! 5pct.! 13pct.! 85pct.! 7pct.! 8pct.!
Source:!Schoenmaker,!2011b.!
Based!on!Top>30!banks!in!EU,!top>15!in!Americas!&!Asia!
Table 1 
As presented in Table 1, the European banking system is not just tightly integrated, it 
is actually significantly less domestically based than the banking sectors of the US 
and Asia, and has continued to be even after the financial crisis of 2008. According to 
the financial trilemma then, the current policy framework for dealing with banking 
crises appear wanting, especially compared to the other two regions included in the 
data, as the banking system in Europe is significantly more international in scope. 
Even if ~1/4 of the activity is outside of EU, the large amount of inter-regional activi-
ty calls for a change in either the composition of the banks’ balance sheets towards 
domestic exposure or continued integration of the regulatory framework.  
As shown in the chapter on the ECB’s response to the current financial crisis, the 
ECB has not been able to restore confidence in the financial systems across the Euro-
zone, and thereby the monetary transmission mechanism, even though it has expanded 
its operations beyond what was originally intended. The lack of trust is illustrated 
through the increasingly large claims the ECB has on periphery National Central 
Banks (NCB) through the Target2 payment system due to the lack of market funding 
flowing to the banking sector in that area of the Eurozone. Just as was the case with 
the large current account deficits, the core NCB’s have approximately corresponding 
claims at the ECB through the system.  
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Figure 26 
However, as shown in Figure 26, the need for extraordinary liquidity in the periphery, 
as carried out by their NCB’s and shown as liabilities to the ECB, pretty much corre-
spond to German claims. This shows that what stability the financial sector of the 
periphery do possess (in terms of liquidity needs being met), is being channelled from 
relatively stable areas of the Eurozone, via Target2, into periphery institutions. In oth-
er words, when private capital suddenly stopped flowing into the periphery countries, 
it was substituted with NCB liquidity as a result of the measures taken by the ECB. 
The Target2 imbalance show the uneven need for liquidity across the Eurozone, with 
the periphery once again being the primary debtors, this time due to their relatively 
weak banking-system (Merler & Pisani-Ferry, 2012).  
The current Target2 balance is, as shown in chapter 4, a direct consequence of the 
ECB’s policies aimed at providing liquidity to the distressed banking-system of the 
periphery. The risk associated with financing the financial sector in the periphery, 
which the private sector suddenly did not want to take on, has in effect been trans-
ferred to the NCB of those countries, and in the last instance the entire ESCB (Cour-
Thimann, 2013: p. 23; Whelan, 2013: p. 18). 
 
The need to step in and provide funding where the market cannot, emphasizes the 
point that, for the moment, financial stability is not occurring naturally, as it is very 
unlikely that private flow of funds would return if the ECB were to reverse its ex-
traordinary liquidity programmes. The current crisis in the banking system has not 
Source: Whelan, 2013: p. 15 
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only required financial assistance from the Troika or ESM, but is also being sustained 
by liquidity provided by the ESCB.  
 
In essence, the financial trilemma does indeed seem to hold true in the Eurozone right 
now. Like in the monetary trilemma, in ‘good’ times it may appear as if all three ob-
jectives are attainable simultaneously, it is not until the economy encounters a rough 
period that stability is challenged. It also took dire times to really challenge national 
policy-makers on the financial trilemma, when the international banking system came 
under immense pressure their ability to co-operate was put under just as intense pres-
sure to produce results (Schoenmaker, 2013).  
 
The response to the crisis by national regulators has been graded as sub-optimal. The 
insufficient nature of the regulatory framework was recognised by parts of the EU 
even before the crisis, notably, the Economic and Financial Committee voiced its 
concern in 2006 prompting the ECOFIN5 to set up a working group on crisis man-
agement (Pisani-Ferry & Sapir, 2010). The basic architecture for dealing with a finan-
cial crisis consisted of cooperation based on weak procedures or just declarations of 
intent, meaning basic necessities like sharing of information was not coordinated at 
EU-level to any meaningful extent (Pisani-Ferry & Sapir, 2010: p. 349) 
.Consequently, the management of the crisis was sub-optimal in different ways. For 
instance, in 2007 the ECB had to take decisions on liquidity operations to financial 
institutions without access to the national governments confidential assessments of 
their health. In 2009 the ECB could not access information on whether or not with-
drawal of extraordinary funding would lead to some banks being unable to obtain 
funding at all (Pisani-Ferry & Sapir, 2010: p. 360). Furthermore, the flow of infor-
mation between national supervisors were sorely lacking, with ‘too many’ instances of 
supervisors not being frank at an early stage about vulnerabilities in the institutions 
they were tasked with supervising (De Larosiére Group, 2009: p. 41). This point is 
supported by the fact that some of the failed banks in 2010-11 had just undergone 
pan-European stress tests and passed with flying colours (Véron, 2013). 
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Resolution of cross-border banks was also left to national supervisors, with one ex-
ample being the dissolution of Fortis by the Dutch and Belgian government respec-
tively. The bank failed in the end of 2008 after being injected with capital from Lux-
embourg, the Netherlands and Belgium to no effect. When it became clear the recapi-
talisation had not worked The Dutch government unilaterally decided to nationalise 
the Dutch operations. Shortly after the Belgian Government did the same. Even with a 
long tradition for cooperation, communication and coordination between the countries 
broke down, leading to a suboptimal solution with high costs due to the split between 
borders (Pisani-Ferry, 2010: p. 355; Schoenmaker, 2013; Hertig et.al, pp.7-8). The 
same issues of lacking coordination were evident in the bailout of Dexia, a French 
bank with operations in Belgium and Luxembourg. The necessary information was 
not shared between borders in a timely manner; meaning decisive action was delayed 
until the last minute (ibid.). 
 
Following the logic of the financial trilemma, there are two apparent options; either to 
keep the national framework of supervision at the cost of large multi-national banks 
or keep the multi-national banks at the cost of national supervision. One solution is to 
force large international banks to be converted to holding companies of nationally 
organised entities subject to national capital requirements, supervision etc. instead of 
being branches. This would limit the international exposure significantly (Pomer-
leano, 2009). However, as the EU has already begun establishing a Banking Union 
supposedly holding the competences needed to regain trust in the financial institutions 
operating in the periphery, the EU has chosen the other option: Centralising supervi-
sion of the Banking Sector to keep the integrated financial market. The rationale for 
the centralisation is one of credibility, if the competences of supervision is given to a 
neutral party with executive powers to close unsustainable banks, the banks that re-
main must be healthy thereby separating public debt and the financial system. In the 
following section, we will analyse the preliminary framework set up in a regulation 
and draft respectively to shed some light on the actual capabilities of the banking un-
ion, and whether or not it can fill the regulatory void revealed by the crisis and re-
establish the singleness of the monetary policy transmission.  
 69 
An analysis of the proposed framework 
Having discussed the way in which the current financial supervision framework re-
sponded, and the deficiencies in this regard, we now turn our attention to the proposed 
new framework to examine the prospects of addressing the need for financial stability 
with a highly internationalised banking sector. This chapter will begin with a brief 
presentation of the two pillars of the Banking Union, the Single Supervisory Mecha-
nism (SSM) and the Single Revolutionary Mechanism (SRM), followed by an as-
sessment of the impact each will have on the current state of bank regulation, supervi-
sion and resolution.  
The(Single(Supervisory(mechanism(
The pending solution to the problems observed in the preceding section is the final 
adoption, of the creation of a Single Supervisory Mechanism. The SSM regulation 
was proposed by the commission in September 2012, along with another regulation, 
aimed to modify voting rights in the European Banking Authority (EBA), which is the 
current EU-body dealing with supervision of individual banks. The SSM was then 
formally adopted by the European Union in October the year later (OJEU 2013). It 
was based on Article 127(6) of the TFEU and therefore required unanimity in the 
Council. 
Finally supervision tasks and competences are being centred in the ECB meaning that 
the ECB, still in cooperation with the national authorities, will now be responsible for 
the supervision of all commercial banks belonging to the Euro Area, as well as all the 
banks of those member states who wishes to participate in the banking union. The 
ECB will assume these new supervisory tasks in a full around September 2014 (OJEU 
2013). 
The goal of the centralisation of bank supervision is to contribute to the safety and 
soundness of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system within the 
Union and each Member State (OJEU 2013 chap. 1 art.1.1). 
 
The ECB will be handed investigatory powers that enables it to obtain the information 
necessary from credit institutions in order to conduct investigations in the Eurozone 
banking system. The ECB will also have the competences to require banks to 
strengthen their governance or improve their capital situation (Memo/13/780). 
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The ECB was supposedly the ideal place to place the supervisory competences given 
its inherent expertise in macroeconomic and financial stability issues. In addition to 
this, the ECB is by EU law an independent institution accommodating no interest of 
any of the individual member states. However there is going to be an organisational 
separation between the ECB’s monetary policy tasks and its supervisory tasks to 
avoid conflicts of interests.  
The building of a banking union is another step towards more economic and fiscal 
integration in the EU, and was also originally called upon by the European Commis-
sion as a cornerstone in its long term visions for further EU integration (COM(2012) 
299 final: 3). In this context the commission stated that the EU’s growth prospects 
were heavily affected by the current lack of confidence in the euro area (ibid), which 
this banking union can aid in resolving through credible and tough supervision.  In 
this way the commission agrees with the president of ECB, Mario Draghi, who also 
states that the SSM will contribute to restore confidence, revive the interbank lending 
and cross-border credit flows, and thereby have tangible effects for the real economy 
(Emmot 2012).  
According to Silvia Merler, affiliate fellow at Bruegel, the supervisory mechanism 
will have effects if it is tough and credible: 
 
“[…] one thing that can be very helpful in this respect is the ECB as a 
quality review (… )on the balance sheet assessment. (...) To the extent 
that if (…) it is tough and it's really credible (…) we should have dis-
pelled doubts and worries about banks’ assets, because what should 
come out is that someone will fail. (…) the ECB itself said someone need 
to fail for the exercise to be credible because otherwise it is just making 
it as a joke” (annex 2). 
 
As is evident she believes that the SSM will lead to identifying unhealthy banks that 
need to be resolved.  
 
“(…), if you do it credibly and in a tough way, this is really potentially 
the thing that can restore confidence. And then at that point most likely 
this will help a lot on the transmission as well, because (…)  then inves-
tors, rationally, would not need to worry much about the fact that the 
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bank is in Spain rather than the bank is in Germany, because those 
banks have been assessed and evaluated from an independent and, sup-
posed to be third, and very tough party.” (annex 2). 
 
Her reasoning is clear, if the ECB becomes the centre of a banking union it will lead 
to the positive effect that the monetary transmission will defrost as the financial insti-
tutions have been individually assessed and deemed healthy. The creation of the bank-
ing union will thereby contribute to a separation of (mis)trust between the financial 
sector and the sovereign state. As will be further assessed below (cf. The Single Reso-
lution Mechanism chapter) the effectiveness of the SSM depends on the final compe-
tences of the SRM as well, for what good is a king without a sword. 
The(possible(problems(of(the(central(single(supervisory(mechanism(
The transition of the supervisory power will supposedly also prevent the national au-
thorities from favouring any of ‘their own’ banks since it is now the ECB that hard-
headedly reviews a lot of the European banks and determine if any of them are in dis-
tress (Allen et.al, 2012: p. 115).  
However, there are reasons to believe that the ECB will not be as hard headed as one 
would have hoped. First of all the ECB would be very concerned about the contagion 
effect of distressed banks (ibid.). There is a risk, that the ECB will let fears over con-
tagion play a role, when deciding whether or not to recommend resolution of a very 
large financial institution. Especially seeing as the banking system in the Euro Area is 
very interconnected, cf. Table 1, the failure of a systemic bank could have dire conse-
quences if not done in an orderly fashion. This consideration would probably be taken 
in a somewhat lighter fashion if it were still up to the national authorities to decide, 
since they are mostly concerned with their own domestic financial markets. In this 
sense it is better for the interests of the Euro Area, as a whole, that the ECB is in 
charge of the supervision, but only if done properly. 
Another argument that supports the ECB as a more lenient supervisor than national 
authorities is that; the ECB would have more resources to resolve a bank, from its 
spread of financing options to a wider area (the whole area of member states that 
wants to join the banking union), than national authorities (ibid: 115). Therefore natu-
rally having more resources to finance the breaking up of bad banks.  
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Since the supervision of Euro Area banks will not be done exclusively by the ECB but 
initially as a shared task between the national and the European level there are some 
limits to the SSM. It is in fact not a single supervisory mechanism just yet. 
There are three reasons for these limits (Verhelst, 2013: p. 5-6): One is that it is not 
yet certain if all the EU members will choose to join the SSM. It is however required 
of the countries who already have the euro as their currency. The second limit is that 
the SSM will not supervise investment firms (and many other institutions such as in-
surance firms, hedge funds, pensions funds etc.) and thus not the whole financial sec-
tor. The reason for that is that investment firms, and the like, fall out of the EU-law’s 
definition of a bank (Directive 2006/48/EC). Since they do not receive deposits from 
the public.  
The final limit to the scope of the SSM is that the ECB must still cooperate with the 
national authorities and they are actually supposed to continue having the supervisory 
competences that are not being transferred to the ECB. The ECB is said to hold the 
‘essential tasks’ while the national authorities still holds the ‘non-essential’. Non-
essential is defined as not strictly necessary to ensure the stability of the financial sec-
tor (Verhelst, 2013: p. 6). 
The(Single(Resolution(Mechanism(
The following analysis of the potential of the coming Single Resolution Mechanism 
will be based on both the proposal of the European Commission for its establishment 
in July 2013 (COM(2013) 520 final) and the on-going negotiations of its establish-
ment taking place at the time of writing this report. For that reason it must be held in 
mind that the exact establishment and outcome of the SRM is not determined as of 
yet. 
After the establishment of a central banking supervision, the SSM, the SRM, is meant 
to supplement it. Even though the SSM should induce an effective prevention of li-
quidity- or solvency problems, banks can still experience times of trouble. Up until 
now, the individual member state has been responsible for supervising and assessing 
whether to aid a bank or resolve it. In the future such decisions has been centralised 
under the new mechanisms.  
 
In order to break the aforementioned vicious circle between government deficits and 
problem banks, the SRM will be central. It is this mechanism that will resolve the 
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problem banks and it is under this mechanism that a Single Resolution Fund will be 
established. Ultimately it is this fund that is going to be utilised, instead of govern-
ments’ public budgets, to pay for the cost of the troubles in the private financial sector 
in the future. The banks themselves will provide the funds for the Single Resolution 
Fund thereby replacing the current national funds of the Euro Area as well as those 
other member states that participate in the SSM. 
As announced in the commission’s proposal: The SRM will ensure that if a bank, de-
spite being subject to the SSM, falls in distress, its resolution can be managed effi-
ciently with minimal costs for the taxpayers and the economy (IP/13/674).  
 
The procedure of SRM resolutions is key to the credibility of the Banking Union and 
the wanted effect on the confidence of the markets. The proposal set forth by the 
Commission is as follows. 
When the SSM finds that a commercial bank is in distress it is up to The Single Reso-
lution Board, consisting of representatives from the ECB, the commission and the 
relevant national authorities to prepare a resolution and decide to utilise the Single 
Resolution Fund (IP/13/674). 
 
Recent negotiations have been centred on the subject of who should be the competent 
decision maker as to decide if and when a bank should be resolved. The Commis-
sion’s proposal was that it should be the commission itself. It was however not all of 
the ministers of the Council that welcomed this proposal (Mussler 2013). Presumably, 
the reason for that was the discrepancy between the content of the membership in 
SSM, which will be the Euro Area plus participation EU-member states, whereas the 
European Commission represents the interests of the Euro Area as well as the EU as a 
whole. The respective governments, as known, appoints the EU-commissioners, yet at 
the same time, the commissioners are not supposed to represent the interests of that 
government or member-state. Further, and related to the latter argument, members 
subject to bank resolutions would want the highest possible influence in the matter 
and avoid loosing too much control of their own financial sector to a neutral central 
EU-body.  
 
However an agreement has just been made. A compromise was presented by the cur-
rent Lithuanian chairmanship. The proposition was to grant the Single Resolution 
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Board, instead of the Commission, the powers to decide when and if a bank should be 
resolved. This board should then highlight the opinion of the affected national super-
visory authorities, which it already entails (cf. above). The core of the complicated 
compromise, however, is that the commission gets the right to make an objection, 
inside a specific time frame, against the decision taken by the advisory board, whereas 
it transfers the matter to the ECOFIN to make a final decision. It has however not yet 
been agreed upon how the rules of voting should be; qualified voting or not. If the 
commission does not make use of its right to object, the decision of the Single Resolu-
tion Board will be final (Mussler 2013a).  
 
There are two very important factors that must be addressed in this procedural propo-
sition, the voting rules and the time frame the commission has to come up with an 
alternative. The Resolution board is comprised of members of the ECB, the Commis-
sion and the national financial supervision authorities. As presented earlier in this 
chapter national representatives will be reluctant to accept the resolution of systemi-
cally important banks whenever possible, even if they have become unsustainable. 
Furthermore, national representatives from other member states will be afraid of con-
tagion from such a closing depending on their level of financial interconnectedness of 
their respective banking systems. Hence, if the voting procedure requires unanimity 
on resolution matters such proposal are likely to be rejected or watered down. As we 
have experienced recently, exemplified by the messy resolution of Fortis and Dexia, 
in a financial crisis acting in a timely fashion is key.  Certainly to limit the possible 
contagion of defaulting banks and business and unanimity will probably prolong the 
course of action. Furthermore, if the proposal is passed quickly it can be expected to 
be the result of a lowest common denominator thereby damaging the credibility of 
both the SSM and SRM. In a free market where trust and credibility is essential for 
the banking system, the voting system of the SRM must ensure that professional and 
neutral solutions prevail. If this is not the case the Banking Union will not aid the in 
the restoration of the single monetary policy transmission.   
 
 
The Single Resolution Fund should take about ten years to fill through taxes on banks 
(Mussler 2013a). The plan is that the respective countries have “separate compart-
ments” of the Single Resolution fund in the beginning. This means that until the funds 
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have been gradually pooled, no member states’ compartment will be used in another 
member-state. The final fund will be based on multilateral agreements and thereby not 
be a part of EU-law. Currently the size of the combined fund after the ten years is 
expected to be around € 55bn, but the European Parliament will probably demand a 
higher amount. The latest in regards to the number of banks that the SRM will be re-
sponsible for, is 230-250 cross-border active banks seated in the EU (Mussler 2013).  
 
If the SRM dissolves a Bank the liabilities of the bank is to be distributed along a lia-
bility cascade where the bank it self and its creditors, depositors etc. will hold the 
initial resolution costs and if their fund are insufficient they will then be followed by 
the Single Resolution Fund (Mussler 2013a), after that the government of the mem-
ber-state and lastly the ESM will be forced to provide direct recapitalisation to the 
institutions. Since there are several steps prior (first customers and creditors, then the 
Single Resolution Fund) there is good reasons to believe that it will be difficult to 
arrive at the point where the member state itself will have to pay, thereby separating 
markets uncertainty of governments’ ability to banks bailouts. In this way there is a 
potential for the SSM and the SRM (the two combined pillars of the banking union) to 
break the vicious circle between government’s budgets and problem banks. This lia-
bility cascade also decreases the chance of a future scenario where the general public 
is forced to strain the sustainability of government finances and live under the effects 
of public austerity due to excessive risk taking in the banking sector.  
The remaining details of the Single Resolution Mechanism will probably be agreed 
upon by a special meeting of the Council on the 18. December and the adoption by 
the European Parliament will engage in 2014 (Mussler 2013a). 
Sub-conclusion, is the banking union all it takes? 
The centralisation of the financial supervision at the EU level is a good idea given the 
high level of cross-border activities on the regional level. Furthermore, the conflicts of 
interest between national supervisors and the lack of information trading make the 
centralisation of the financial system even more compelling.  
 
Access to finance is still a very pressing problem in the periphery and is prolonging 
the societal suffering of these member states. Due to the banking system’s current 
exposure to government bond prices and sovereign debt the access to finance for 
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SMEs is distorted across the Eurozone seriously affecting the GDP Growth. As the 
prospect of large fall in sovereign debt in the periphery is not on the horizon, it is piv-
otal that the banking system becomes less reliable on government finances. 
 
The banking union is a serious attempt to break the vicious circle between the sover-
eign debt crisis and the bank crisis by pooling the resolution funds and supervisory 
competences to a central European level thereby giving banks strong incentives to 
behave responsibly. 
The final design of the SRM and its subsequent actions will determine whether the 
Banking Union will succeed in re-establishing the monetary transmission mechanism 
in the Eurozone.  
 
However it would be naive to think that the Banking Union is the key to future growth 
in the Eurozone periphery as the macroeconomic imbalances are still very much in 
place. Even if the monetary transmission mechanism were functioning and GDP 
growth returned, the growth would once of gain be transferred to the core due to the 
poor competitiveness in the periphery via current account deficits. This problem will 
be addressed in the following chapter in order to see the bigger picture and debate 
possible actions that could aid the combined effort to bring the entire EU back on 
track.   
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6.(Supplementary(solutions(to(the(financialK(and(sovereign(
debt(crisis(
 
As presented in the previous chapters the inflation and growth rates are declining in 
the Eurozone. The consequence of this is that some member states remain deeply in-
debted and are facing long prospects for a return to growth and balanced budgets. So 
far, this paper has explained which measures the ECB has taken, but conclude that 
supplementary action is necessary. Here two different approaches are suggested that 
can possibly benefit the ECB in the effort to create stability within the Eurozone and 
sustainable growth in the future.  
 
The two approaches are 1) a contractual sovereign debt restructure framework and 2) 
a fiscal union. 
 
The need to discuss alternatives and more comprehensive reform of the Eurozone is 
quite evident. As we discussed in the chapter 3, the periphery countries are, as it 
stands, at a competitive disadvantage relative to the core. The implication being that, 
even if the transmission mechanism is restored and does indeed lead to easier access 
to credit in the periphery, it will not solve the underlying imbalance in the Eurozone. 
Without addressing the competitive disadvantage still present in the periphery, a re-
turn of relatively equal growth risk being unsustainable due to the current dynamics, 
namely that the growth will result in a deficit on the balance of payments in the pe-
riphery.  
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Figure 27 
Figure 27 show the cumulative growth in the ULC in select Eurozone countries. Even 
if the ULC was decreasing for a period in the periphery the gap is still very signifi-
cant, emphasizing the point that a prolonged period of readjustment is indeed needed 
to level out the playing field.  
 
The essence of our argument is that the Banking Union alone will not solve the debt-
crisis. At best, it will contribute to a lessening of the financial crisis if it indeed man-
ages to separate government finances and trust in the banking sector, easing access to 
credit in the periphery. As access to credit is an essential part of a well-functioning 
economy, this will indisputably be a step in the right direction. But seeing as the 
economies in the Eurozone have not been converging we find it constructive to dis-
cuss some complementary measures to the banking union. They may not be politically 
feasible but can address the fundamental imbalances responsible for the sovereign 
debt crisis. In the following sections we present two alternatives, the first being less 
extensive than the second. Both are aimed at ‘completing’ the Eurozone, and bringing 
it closer to a real OCA.  
A Contractual Sovereign Debt Restructure and Lending into Arrears 
One alternative for the EU and the ECB could be a contractual framework for han-
dling sovereign debt. The Contractual sovereign debt restructure framework is based 
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on an idea presented by the IMF and Ashoka Mody from the Bruegel institute. In the 
IMF world economic outlet from 2012, the IMF offers a lesson learned from history 
regarding an internal devaluation. It presents the United Kingdom’s attempt to under-
go an internal devaluation in the aftermath of the First World War. The UK tried to 
combine tight monetary- and fiscal policy to achieve a lower price level, and create 
growth. However, the effects were absent, and turned out to be the exact opposite to 
the purpose, as it led to rising unemployment, low growth and a rising debt. In this 
case the reduction in the price level, which is the aim of an internal devaluation, came 
at a high cost. This mirrors the current attempt to use austerity to create growth in the 
EU, which is proving very costly for the population in the periphery (IMF, 2010: 
p.125). As Ashoka Mody notes, the European policy makers have another alternative 
through debt restructuring. Policy makers could: 
“Restructure private debt (‘burn the bondholders’), offer highly conces-
sional official finance to the distressed economies, and rely on fiscal 
austerity (Mody. 2013, p.9).  
 
Mody notes that austerity has been chosen but argues, that alternatives could have 
been sought. An alternative way could be to force the banks to accept haircuts on the 
sovereign debt they hold. This option has been criticized for leaving banks even more 
vulnerable leading to worse cross-border consequences. However, studies indicate, 
that the market recognizes the strength of different balance sheets, and that it would 
prefer debt restructuring to an ad hoc solution that does not deal with the underlying 
debt problems (Mody, 2013: p.16). His criticism is that by not following the no-
bailout clause, and bailout the private sector on ad-hoc basis (turning private debt to 
sovereign debt), the sovereign state is left worse off, limiting growth potential. Fur-
thermore it teaches the private sector that if it encounters a crisis in the future gov-
ernments will bail them out. This would decrease the incentive for prudent behaviour, 
as the consequences are limited. Therefore, he calls for an orderly mechanism of sov-
ereign default (Mody, 2013: p. 22). Mody acknowledge that austerity measures in the 
long run reduces debt ratios, but it can also create a persisting growth weakness caus-
ing lasting damage, in other words it can create a vicious circle. He argues that fol-
lowing a default, the sovereign state would be able to return to the market relatively 
quickly, and even though it is punished for a brief period, it will bounce back (Mody, 
2013: p 26). In the current system, defaults have been too little too late (Mody, 2013: 
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p. 19; IMF, 2013: p. 15). This calls for a new way of thinking, and managing govern-
ment debt. If investors know that EMU members will default on their government 
bonds the sovereign debt level will never rise above the contractual default level, as 
creditors are aware of the risks associated with breaching it. Furthermore, if a member 
state is gravely hit by an external shock, the contractual deleveraging ensures certain-
ty of procedure and thereby theoretically prevents excessive capital flight. If this had 
been in place before 2007 the current sovereign debt levels would not be at the current 
level, as the disorderly deleveraging should have been prevented and asset values 
would not have plummeted at the same pace as it has now.  
 
The IMF suggests that a framework for sovereign debt is set up, were it is possible to 
default if the growth of a given country is not sustainable, which would eliminate the 
speculation of when a default could happen. A way this can be done is through creat-
ing a program as Lending Into Arrears6 (LIA), which needs to be supported by a fund. 
In the EMU such a fund could be the already established. LIA aims at reducing cost 
of adjustments while facilitating orderly debt restructuring that would secure external 
viability and should apply to sovereign arrears to external private creditors.  
 
It is suggested that the ESM may lend to a member if it is deemed that support is vital 
for a successful implementation of the member states’ adjustment program. The ESM 
assesses if the member is pursuing an appropriate policy and is making an effort in 
‘good faith’ to reach a collaborative agreement with its private creditors. By resolving 
the debt in good faith, it will secure future trust from the market (IMF, 2013: p.11). 
The good faith effort is questioned by Joseph Stieglitz (2013) and as he notes: 
“Debt restructurings often entail conflicts among different claimants. 
That is why, for domestic debt disputes, countries have bankruptcy laws 
and courts. But there is no such mechanism to adjudicate international 
debt disputes” (Stieglitz, 2013). 
When countries are trying to organize sovereign debt restructuring, it is having trou-
ble rolling over debt, and is therefore at the mercy of its creditors, which leaves it at a 
huge disadvantage when bargaining with its lenders. Furthermore, due to the poor 
                                                
6 LIA is when a sovereign has missed a payment that it was contractually bound to pay. If it fails to 
pay, it would first try to default on the loan by negotiating with the creditor in good faith. If the debtor 
and creditor fail to reach an agreement, a fund like the ESM could act as last resort. 
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economic outlook, the country may well find itself in a similar situation in a not too 
distant future. When a debt crisis occurs, the blame is often attached on the debtors, 
even though the borrower also played a vital role by enabling the debtor to take on too 
much debt. As the banking system is normally projected as a way of reducing risk, it 
is ironic that they have lent too much to their debtors, given that they are supposed to 
be experts on risk management and assessment (Stieglitz, 2013). This leads to Mody’s 
suggestion. He suggest that a contractual framework should help the sovereign states: 
 
“Sovereign debt should be recognised as equity (a residual claim on the 
sovereign), operationalized by the automatic lowering of the debt bur-
den upon the breach of contractually-specified thresholds. Making debt 
more equity-like is also the way forward for speedy private deleverag-
ing” (Mody, 2013: p.1). 
 
This Idea implies that the debt should be formed in contracts containing an automatic 
provision for restructuring, when for instance the states’ debt to GDP ratio exceeded 
an agreed threshold. This way the market would know when a sovereign debt restruc-
ture might happen, and this would theoretically lead to less speculation.  
A (real) fiscal union 
As already explained in the chapter on the Optimum Currency Area, a fiscal union 
should preferably accompany a monetary union. This will entail some degree of cen-
tralization of national budgets, which would allow money transfers to regions and 
countries that, would otherwise cause imbalances within the union (De Grauwe, 2009: 
pp.250). Another solution to the rising imbalances within the Eurozone could therefor, 
be a fiscal union. However, the political climate in the Eurozone makes it difficult to 
turn theory into reality, as there are major imbalances within the Eurozone, and no 
country wants to pay for the deficiencies in other countries. More fiscal integration is 
thusly a tough idea to sell to the citizens in surplus countries. So the minimalist ap-
proach taken with the fiscal constrains are understandable, when bearing in mind the 
political realities that the EMU faces (Cottarelli, 2012). Also, as the TFEU contains a 
no-bailout clause, fiscal integration would require a treaty-change, which would likely 
need public approval through a vote. 
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The ESM could be seen as the first steps toward a fiscal union, as it has provided 
capital to indebted member states, but the capital has been provided as loans. Firstly, 
loans needs to be paid back and secondly, ESM-loans come with strict conditionality, 
which is essentially a surrender of fiscal policy until the budget is deemed within the 
limits of the fiscal compact. The ESM has proven to have at least three shortcomings 
compared to a Fiscal union. The first is its intergovernmental nature, which means the 
contributions given to ESM transfer into influence for the contributor. This implies 
that national parliaments could acquire veto right over ESM schemes, adding uncer-
tainty to market perception of the distressed member state (Nicoli, 2013: p. 2). The 
second shortcoming is limitations imposed on a country’s sovereignty that leads the 
distressed member state to delay their application until it is in desperate need (it is 
also forbidden to do so before). As shown it has been painful for the citizens of a dis-
tressed member state to undergo an ESM scheme, which more often than not impact 
their perception of the EU and EMU negatively (Nicoli, 2013: p. 2).  
Thirdly the ESMs funds are limited, and it is questionable whether they could finance 
two large economies such the Spanish and Italian at the same time (Nicoli, 2013: p. 
2).  
 
Even if the ESM can never substitute real fiscal integration, which appears to be the 
best step forward at the moment, centralizing public budgets is currently not feasible. 
So an unconventional way towards a Fiscal union is needed. Carlo Cottarelli, IMF 
director of the Fiscals Affairs Department, suggested that a fiscal union for the EU 
could consist of three pillars: 
- Stronger constraints relating to member state deficits and debt, including pub-
lic financial management processes,  
- A larger central budget, as this would both provide the tools for risk sharing 
and contribute to reducing some key economic differences across countries; 
- Increased harmonization of non-fiscal policy, including a banking union with 
an appropriate fiscal backstop to sever the sovereign-bank links that have 
slowed a resolution of the crisis (Cottarelli, 2012). 
 
As a centralized budget has major political challenges, stronger constraints related to 
the member states deficit is need. This was introduced with what was called the “six 
pack”. With the six-pack the SGP was tightened, and now include deeper fiscal coor-
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dination, stronger corrective action, minimum requirement for national budgets and 
the Macroeconomic Imbalance procedure (MIP). With the deeper fiscal coordination, 
member states can be fined for exceeding a Government deficit of 3 pct. with an in-
terest-bearing deposit of 0.2 pct. of GDP, and the same corrective manners are appli-
cable for the government debt level, which must not exceed a level of 60 pct. relative 
to GDP. The minimum requirement for national budgetary framework is simply to be 
achieved by securing that the framework can comply with the SGP. The MIP monitor 
macroeconomic trends within the Eurozone, to identify and eliminate potential risk at 
an early stage (EC.Europa.eu – Economic Governance). These are, according to Cot-
tarelli, a step in the right direction, but it cannot replace the safety that a traditional 
fiscal union would create. Furthermore, it is still possible for the member state to con-
duct its own fiscal policy, and even though fines are introduced, it would still be pos-
sible for at country to introduce a fiscal policy that might lead the public budget in 
violation of the SGP. To tackle this problem the EU could be given a veto on national 
fiscal policy (Cottarelli, 2012).  
 
With the second pillar a central budget for fiscal policy should be established, like the 
budget on agriculture. How big the contribution to this central budget would depend 
on the member states’ willingness to implement such a measure (Cottarelli, 2012). As 
already mentioned the political willingness to adopt such measures is minimal, but it 
would be the real contribution in the task of reducing the macro-economic imbalances 
within the Eurozone.  
 
The third pillar is a harmonization of non-fiscal policies. An example of such is the 
creation of the banking union. As already shown in the paper, the ideas are on the 
table, and the SSM is already agreed upon, but it needs to be accompanied by the 
SRM with the competences to enforce supervisory decisions credibly in order to have 
separating effect between monetary transmission and sovereign debt.  
 
Proper and swift execution of SRM and SSM is very important. Increased cost and 
reduced availability of working capital limits necessary investment and adoption of 
technologies improving productivity, which is sorely needed, especially in the periph-
ery. Seeing as credit is least available in the south, re-establishing a functional finan-
cial sector is a precondition for improved growth prospects in the hardest hit coun-
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tries. (Darvas et.al 2013) Each day fundamentally solid SMEs in the periphery is de-
nied credit to expand hurts the growth prospect, especially as they can potentially in-
crease productivity and exports. SMEs also make up a large part of the labour market, 
so improving the economic outlook could lead to more hiring of workers lessening the 
burden on public finances.  
 
If these three pillars are enforced the baby steps towards a fiscal union is taken. The 
first and third pillar is already partly enforced, while the second pillar, must be seen as 
a major political project for the Eurozone in the future.   
We do realize that the third pillar could include more comprehensive cross-border 
coordination, e.g. coordination of labour policy, to address the large gap in competi-
tiveness observed in the chapter on the imbalances in the Eurozone. However, we find 
such integration to be unrealistic in the political climate right now. Even if the crisis 
may not have originated from irresponsible government spending, except maybe for 
in Greece, the countries of the periphery do have problems with their debt and deficit. 
Therefore, austerity is necessary, but for the common good it would be preferable if 
the loss of domestic demand was offset by external demand, for instance from Ger-
many. (Krugman, 2013: p. 185)  
 
The primary issue with the presented plan is, that it cannot stop core countries from 
keeping pressure on their wages. As of October this year the only periphery country 
with lower price inflation than Germany throughout the crisis (2008-2013 was Ire-
land, with price inflation in Spain and Greece outpacing that of the EA17 average 
(Eurostat – HICP) The implication being that, even if the periphery countries continue 
their costly readjustment it will have little to no effect if the rest of the Eurozone does 
not increase their price level relative to the periphery. Currently, “ (…) the sins being 
punished for the most part never happened.” (Krugman, 2013: p. 187) The punish-
ment is very tight budgetary control in response to a false perception that it was irre-
sponsible budgetary control that spurred the current deficit and debt levels in the pe-
riphery, but as we showed in the chapter on the imbalances, average periphery debt as 
pct. of GDP prior to the crisis was actually very close to the required 60 pct. in the 
SGP. The deteriorating budgets have not been due to irresponsibility, but rather the 
automatic stabiliser, which is beyond government control.  
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There is no way to force policies on neither the ECB nor member states not undergo-
ing readjustment via the ESM. The ECB is required to aim for average price inflation 
of ~2 pct., and whereas higher inflation, essentially expansionary monetary policy, 
could be useful it does not seem likely as the ECB actually raised interest rates in 
2011 due to fear of overshooting inflation. (Krugman, 2013: p. 185) It does not seem 
as if the EU even considers more comprehensive control of anything but the public 
debt and deficit, which really did not help prevent the excessive build-up of private 
debt leading up to the crisis.  
Just obtaining the ~2 pct. rate would of course improve things. Coordination between 
core and periphery is also important. The core should not enforce policies to prevent 
inflation from rising above the 2 pct. mark as long as it does not compromise the 
overall target, which, as shown in Figure 28, is not the case right now. (Darvas et.al, 
2013) 
 
Figure 28 
As illustrated in Figure 28, the inflation rate has fluctuated during the crisis, to the 
point where the latest available data (October 2013) shows a mere 0.7 pct. rate of in-
flation, significantly lower than the 2 pct. observed in January this year. Indeed, ex-
pansionary monetary policy is needed to correct this. An improvement of the trans-
mission mechanism via the banking union would certainly be welcome in this respect. 
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The 3-point framework presented by the IMF will thusly have great chances of im-
proving upon the current framework, but will primarily do so because the current 
framework is so sub-optimal. The political climate is just as, if not even more sub-
optimal for more European integration at this point, making more ambitious plans 
impossible. Just completing the presented framework would be a major accomplish-
ment, and indeed a step in the right direction 
 (
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Conclusion:((
What effect has the expansion of the European Central Bank’s competences and 
measures had on the financial- and sovereign debt crisis in the Euro Area? 
Taking departure in the problem formulation the following conclusions have been 
made:  
 
The Euro Area is indisputably in a deep financial and sovereign debt crisis and 
whereas the primary response of the EU until now, has been a tighter grip on budget 
deficits and public debt, the underlying cause for the current crisis lie elsewhere. The 
integration of financial markets has led to an accumulation of primarily private debt in 
the periphery countries fuelled by cheap credit flowing from the core. The cheap cred-
it and subsequent increase in consumption spurred price- and wage inflation in the 
periphery outpacing the increase in productivity relative to the core, especially Ger-
many. 
 
In the period of financial turmoil (2007-2008) the credit began to dry up. The free-
lending financial institutions in the periphery could no longer refinance their opera-
tions let alone extend new credit as core banks began to prefer safety to returns. The 
lack of credit in the financial institutions put a strain on public budgets through 
bailouts and large state-issued guarantees. The lack of economic activity naturally 
spilled over to the real economy resulting in increased unemployment putting a fur-
ther strain on the public budgets and transformed the financial crisis into the financial- 
and sovereign debt crisis in 2010.  
 
The monetary instruments and competences of the ECB has been continuously ex-
panded as the crisis has unfolded. Some of the expansion has been initiated within the 
current mandate by the ECB itself, and some has been the result of developments be-
yond the ECB’s immediate control.  
 
By initiating several non-standard measures the ECB has successfully helped fight off 
the soaring sovereign bond yields in the periphery by stepping in as a lender of last 
resort in 2010. This new role has, to some extent at least, sustained a highly dysfunc-
tional banking sector by providing ample liquidity when the interbank market froze. 
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Despite the ECB’s best efforts however, the macroeconomic imbalances uncovered 
render the crisis too extensive for the ECB to solve within its current scope. The cre-
ditworthiness of businesses in the periphery is influenced by the growth prospects and 
general economic outlook of the individual country, meaning that the liquidity pro-
vided to the banking system is not being properly transmitted to the real economy. 
The receivers of credit place it in safe places, such as back in the ECB, even if the 
yield on such capital is very low. This creates a vicious circle of lacking investment 
leading to lacking activity in the economy, once again leading to tighter access to 
credit. 
 
To sever the tie between government finance and perceived risk in the economy, EU 
is in the midst of completing the banking union. It has not yet been completed, mak-
ing it hard to conclude on its actual impact, but it is indeed a step in the right direc-
tion. The current framework for bank regulation has proven insufficient during the 
crisis, as the financial trilemma appear to hold true; a multinational banking sector 
regulated nationally cannot produce financial stability. 
 
In conclusion, the build-up to the crisis left periphery countries vulnerable to a sudden 
stop in capital inflows, when funding was indeed withdrawn, the inherent weaknesses 
in the Euro Area became apparent. The ECB has acted within its mandate and beyond 
when the regular monetary policy instruments proved insufficient. Even if the banking 
union is successful in cutting the tie between government finances and public debt, it 
will not solve the weakness in the construction of the Euro Area.  
 
Specifically the lack of fiscal integration and coordination of different policy areas, 
such as labour policy, is of real concern. For the on-going expansion of EU and com-
petences to be successful we stress the importance of a comprehensive framework 
addressing both monetary and fiscal policy deficiencies in the Euro Area. The bank-
ing union is the first steps, now it is time to decide where they lead.  
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Annex(2(
Transcript of the interview with Silvia Merler, associate fellow at the 
Bruegel Institute 
 
#00:00:26-2# Rasmus: Well, if you could just introduce yourself 
 
#00:00:28-5# Silvia: So, My name is Sivlia Merler, and I currently work as 
an affiliate fellow at Bruegel and I'm doing a Phd at the same time, trying to do 
a Phd at the same time, thats a better description 
 
#00:00:41-1# Rasmus: Right. Well, as i tried to explain to you we are doing 
a paper on the ECB and the current challenges that they face with the macro-
economic imbalances in the Eurozone especially. 
 
#00:00:58-2# Rasmus: so, the first question is a quite large one, but, ehm, 
what do you see as the main tasks for the ECB in regards to the macro-
economic imbalances within the eurozone at the current time? 
 
#00:01:15-8# Silvia: I think i guess that there are two dimensions actually to 
this question, on one hand you have that and this is something we have ob-
served since some time that the monetary policy seems to have asymmetric 
effects on countries so the average interest rate seems to be actually (incom-
prehensible) in the eurozone in the moment so in the sense that it has been 
too strict for someone in the early face and too relaxed for others, and then 
now its the other way around. So, this is of course one of the problems in the 
macroeconomic imbalances, there is a couple of things that the ECB will be 
doing in the future that may open a door, say to, i guess, interesting things 
from the oversight side there is the macro prudential policy part, which is in a 
sense related to the macroeconomic imbalances to the point that macro pru-
dential policy is a focus in the financial cycle, so the financial cycle is, in a 
sense, is driven by underlying macroeconomic divergences and variables that 
of course play a role. And then at the same time there is a role in macroeco-
nomic imbalance procedure oversight that has been detained in the new pro-
cedure for the commission, but it seems to be very, very valueless, so and 
also not particular strong obviously on what the ECB could do, it seems to be 
like more a participation kind of thing, so its really. But of course, to the, i 
mean, if you agree with the idea that the macro prudential policy (incompre-
hensible) something that is ultimately related to macroeconomic imbalances 
behind it, (incomprehensible) some macroeconomic environments, develop-
ments, driving then, it does make sense to think that the ECB shouldn't at 
least involvement in the macroeconomic imbalances that are inside, to, be-
cause (incomprehensible)  
 
#00:03:22-8# Rasmus: That is, cool, several good points. Ehm.  
 
#00:03:30-6# Silvia: its not that i have a clear idea of the ECB could actual-
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ly play a more powerful role in the macroeconomic imbalance procedure be-
cause, i mean, it is true that i see it more as a commission kind of competence 
than an ECB kind of competence.  
 
#00:03:49-8# Rasmus: Yeah 
 
#00:03:49-8# Silvia: For the implication that it has also. Ehm, but yeah, i 
guess that the point is, being in charge of macro prudential policy and being 
macro prudential policy type is something that ultimately is related to macroe-
conomic variables and some sense to the developments on that front, it could 
be (incomprehensible) on the macroeconomic side, which i suppose the ECB 
will have in Germany, but then i don't know how much this transfers into for-
mal oversight or so.  
 
#00:04:20-3# Rasmus: Ehm. You mentioned the differentiated optimal in-
terest rate for each country. Ehm. But. And of course you also show in your 
paper with Zsalt that it's quite different from the (incomprehensible), but, there 
isn't, do you think that the Central Bank should, in a time of great difference in 
growth potential and unemployment rate, have a more maybe, try to over-
shoot the inflation target more than is set.  
 
#00:05:08-8# Silvia: Well, honestly, i mean, overshoot is something that, 
overshoot is one thing and another thing is actually keeping to the target, be-
cause inflation has been current, has been subdued for a long time, so (...) 
 
#00:05:19-5# Rasmus: Yes. 
 
#00:05:19-5# Silvia: (...) even without arguing that the ECB should over-
shoot inflation you could argue that the ECB should target 2%, so it should 
actually fulfill its mandate. 
 
#00:05:30-2# Rasmus: Yes.  
 
#00:05:29-8# Silvia: Below, but close, but really close, so not like 1.2% as it 
currently has been  
 
#00:05:37-0# Rasmus: Yes. 
 
#00:05:37-1# Silvia: I mean, and that would already have an impact of 
course.  
 
#00:05:37-9# Silvia: So in a sense, it's, i guess that in light of the macroe-
conomic developments that we have seen over this year, it does not neces-
sarily need overshooting, but it may just need, like, getting actually implement-
ing the target with equality, so say, go to 2% or 1.9%, or i don't know (...) 
 
#00:05:59-4# Rasmus: Yes.  
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#00:06:00-5# Silvia: (...) but, really close to the target, and just start making 
the real ECB target with already help i guess, because it could already be 
beneficial (incomprehensible) this is actually, there was another paper that we 
wrote in august last year, (incomprehensible) and its called macroeconomics, 
simple macroeconomics of north and south in the Euroarea, and maybe its 
interesting for you as well. It was basically showing these things, it's a very 
very like dummy model kind of things, where we were showing that, of course, 
developments in the monetary union they are basically interrelated, so coun-
tries are interrelated and so, one consider the single central bank in the mid-
dle of all this.  
 
#00:06:49-5# Silvia: Of course it makes a difference if you target, in that 
paper we were like taking the extreme case. 2 things: Either you target aver-
age, or you target the inflation rate of the low inflation countries, so you target 
the inflation rate of Germany or you target the interest rate of Germany. So 
you would target the best performing state.  
 
#00:07:08-6# Rasmus: Yes.  
 
#00:07:08-6# Silvia: And we were showing that, that would already have 
made a significant difference, so to actually go to the real target, to actual go 
to the implement the ECB mandate in a sense without overshooting, so with-
out going above, would have already made a difference considering the situa-
tion, so considering the fact that inflation has been particularly low. And, so 
maybe that's interesting for you. (incomprehensible)  
 
#00:07:33-5# Rasmus: Yeah. Sounds.  
 
#00:07:33-9# Silvia: It's more kind of theoretical things, but uhm.  
 
#00:07:36-3# Rasmus: Yep. So... okay.  
 
#00:07:40-2# Rasmus: Perhaps we will, but.  
 
#00:07:42-3# Silvia: So, the, i mean the, the conclusion is just that I think it 
is unnecessary needed to overshoot, but, in this particular circumstances and 
with this particular macroeconomic nature it would just be helpful to actually 
stick to the target.  
 
#00:07:57-3# Rasmus: Stick to the target. ehm. So, European Central Bank 
lowered its interest rate last week, ehm, to 0.25 - something like that.  
 
#00:08:09-8# Silvia: Mhm. (in agreement) 
 
#00:08:10-5# Rasmus: Ehm. Following maybe, trying to follow its mandate 
to 2%, ehm.  
 
#00:08:18-1# Silvia: Yes, because inflation now (incomprehensible) is par-
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ticularly low.  
 
#00:08:22-3# Rasmus: Yes, i think it's 1.3%. But. Ehm.  
 
#00:08:28-3# Rasmus: What i think about, you know, you have the mone-
tary transferability or transmission to nation-states may not be as high as the-
oretically possible because of the economic climate that is right now.  
 
#00:08:47-0# Rasmus: Ehm.  
 
#00:08:49-3# Rasmus: How do you think that the central bank, European 
Central Bank, can try to transfer this monetary policy more efficiently.  
 
#00:09:00-8# Silvia: Ehm. So basically you are saying that: Yes they low-
ered the interest rate but then in the end it is not going to have a big impact 
because the interest as its going through (...) 
 
#00:09:09-1# Rasmus: Yes, exactly.  
 
#00:09:12-4# Silvia: Yes. That's actually the big question, because in the 
end if you think about it, we, or, the entire discussion that we have had since 
the OMT and afterwards is always been, i mean it is going to be super-useful 
because it is going to restore confidence and in a sense kind of break this 
perception that - There is in using? financial fragmentation and this will im-
prove things, and it has improved things significantly on the government side. 
So on the government side thats in crisis (...) 
 
#00:09:41-3#  Rasmus: Yes.  
 
#00:09:41-4# Silvia: (...) it worked amazingly.  
 
#00:09:42-6# Silvia: The point is that it doesn't, it hasn't restored transmis-
sion that much if you look at the differentials of lending rates across countries, 
so the gap is still there, no?  
 
#00:09:54-3# Rasmus: Yeah.  
 
#00:09:55-2# Silvia: And, which kind of tells you that the gap is related to 
something that is beyond the simple sovereign overcharge, say surcharge of 
risk.  
 
#00:10:05-1# Silvia: And it must be something else, so on one hand its 
probably something in the banking system, so of course banks are not. Banks 
are.  
 
#00:10:17-6# Silvia: It's not that banks don't have capital, but i guess that 
banks have, due to the economic downturns and cycles, they're facing in-
creasing low performing loans, especially in the south of the Euroarea so this 
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is of course cause for concern.  
 
#00:10:32-2# Silvia: There is still a lack of confidence in things in the bank-
ing system, so it's still, for example, i mean they can find, like we saw that af-
ter the OMT there has been a revival in deposit inflows in banks in the south, 
that's true. 
 
#00:10:47-2# Rasmus: Yeah.  
 
#00:10:47-6# Silvia: But they still pay a lot of money on that, so they still 
pay a very high interest rate on deposits, which means funding is not really 
cheap yet, so eh. It is true that funding is coming back, but it is coming back at 
a significantly higher price than the ECB rate for instance.  
 
#00:11:07-3# Silvia: So i think one thing that can be very helpful in this re-
spect is the ECB as a quality review, so on the balance sheet assessment as 
a quality review to the extent that if you really do it credibly so if it is tough and 
it's really credible, then after that, we should have dispelled doubts and wor-
ries about banks assets because what should come out is that someone will 
fail. I mean the ECB itself said someone need to fail for the exercise to be 
credible because otherwise it's just making it as a joke.  
 
#00:11:40-9# Silvia: Someone will fail and it's, to me it's still not 100% clear 
how this can be dealt with exactly, but after that i think that, if you do it credi-
bly and in a tough way this is really potentially the thing that can restore confi-
dence, (incomprehensible) and then at that point most likely this will help a lot 
on the transmission as well, because at point then investors, rationally, 
wouldn't need to worry much about the fact that the bank is in Spain rather 
than the bank is in Germany, because those banks have been assessed and 
evaluated from an independent and, supposed to be third and very tough par-
ty, and so this should really help i think.  
 
#00:12:35-0# Rasmus: So you see the current mission of both the ECB but 
also the political side of the Union to be, to kind of put together this banking 
(...) 
 
#00:12:54-8# Silvia: Yeah as a quality review.  
 
#00:12:56-4# Rasmus: Yeah as a quality review as fast as possible? 
 
#00:12:59-4# Silvia: Well, as fast as possible, i mean it's already, the time-
line is already there basically so they're starting in 2014 and they're going on 
until the ECB will take over which will be in 2015 i guess like that. 
 
#00:13:13-4# Rasmus: Yeah.  
 
#00:13:14-0# Silvia: I mean it's not really the. I Guess some lag is expected 
because of the dimension and size of the exercise, which is unprecedented 
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for a single central bank.  
 
#00:13:29-3# Rasmus: Yep.  
 
#00:13:30-2# Silvia: But what really makes the difference i think, what really 
will make the difference is how it's going to be conducted, so how credible it 
is. Because we have already - it's not the first time we will run stress tests, i 
mean the EBA has been running stress tests for years and it's not that they 
had this great reputation because they - i mean - we all know the cases (in-
comprehensible) stress test was no problem, Dexia being one of the best 
banks in Europe and then just i mean a completely crap business model - just 
don't say that i said crap. (laughing)  
 
#00:14:02-7# Rasmus: (laughing)  
 
#00:14:03-9# Silvia: (laughing)  
 
#00:14:05-3# Silvia: . Crap
 
#00:14:05-6# Silvia & Rasmus: (laughing)  
 
#00:14:06-7# Rasmus:  That's the quote
 
#00:14:07-9# Silvia:  Crap. 
 
#00:14:09-1# Rasmus:  Got it: Quote
 
#00:14:10-5# Silvia:  That's it
 
#00:14:11-4# Ulrich: Silvia Merler 
 
#00:14:10-7# Silvia:  (...) Said that Dexia had a crap business model!
 
#00:14:15-1# Silvia: (laughing)  
 
#00:14:15-8# Rasmus: oooh 
 
#00:14:16-4# Silvia: No i mean that's the point, is that it really make a dif-
ference if you do it credibly or not i think it's really important. And at the same 
time it's very delicate of course because you have i mean the kind of banks 
they are testing, they are very big, so when some of these banks, if some of 
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these banks, as is expected, will fail. And maybe, most likely more than one i 
suppose. Then. I guess, i don't know what kind of shortfalls we are talking 
about but since they are big banks, so whatever shortfalls it is going to be 
quite significant at the best. so.  
 
#00:14:50-2# Silvia: And then, what you want is that you assume that they 
go on the market and tries to raise capital themselves, because you would like 
to a bit limit the bail-out side of the story for the reasons we know, then, i 
mean, many banks, many big banks going to the market at the same time for 
raising capital possible in significantly large amounts at the same time i mean 
it's not necessarily, i don't know, i mean i think i can kind of see a risk of that 
capital being either very expensive or just not being there entirely so just, you 
know. That they could not find enough people willing invest in them.  
 
#00:15:34-4# Rasmus: yes.  
 
#00:15:35-2# Silvia: I mean, i don't know, i guess it depends on also on 
confidence of outside investors of the rest of the world, whether the exercise 
is credible or not, so that then, you can think: Yes am i investing in your capi-
tal shortfall, like expected capital shortfall today but out of the exercise you 
should come out as a very solid bank so i expect you to make profits in the 
future. I mean, there is many, many issues at stake i guess, so it's super im-
portant, but at the same time it is super delicate because of course it's  
 
#00:16:05-6# Rasmus: Yes.  
 
#00:16:07-7# Rasmus: Okay, thank you very much 
 
#00:16:11-7# Rasmus: then we move on to a bit more of the political side of 
the central banks acting in the crisis and the question is, what impact, if any, 
has the need for political approval had on the efficiency on the European Cen-
tral Banks response  
 
#00:16:37-2# Silvia: What you mean exactly by political approval though? 
 
#00:16:39-7# Rasmus: Errrrrrr.  
 
#00:16:41-5# Silvia: Like the implicit, errrr. 
 
#00:16:44-0# Rasmus: Yes, the, the, the kind of, hvad skal man sige, dis-
course that has been, and the erm. The kind of ad hoc competence adjust-
ments.  
 
#00:16:58-3# Silvia: Because the way i see this, like, the way i see the way 
the ECB has behaved during the crisis it's not a (incomprehensible). So in 
many instances i see the ECB as forcing things in the environment in some 
sense.  
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#00:17:09-5# Rasmus: Okay.  
 
#00:17:10-2# Silvia: So for example, the fiscal compact it's first being men-
tioned in a speech by Draghi from the parliament he said we need a fiscal 
compact and bla bla bla and then like one week after that they, they actually 
agreed in signing one and this is one thing.  
 
#00:17:25-3# Silvia: Or for example, it's a bit, the entire rhetoric of the ECB 
during the crisis even if you think about it seems it doesn't intend, Trichet him-
self, was continuously saying that, you know, we are a central bank so we can 
do things, but it's not that we can substitute governments, so like governments 
should take the actions needed to rightly complement the central bank, be-
cause otherwise the central bank interventioning itself and by itself doesn't 
really make sense, it's not really magical. 
 
#00:17:53-9# Rasmus: No.  
 
#00:17:54-1# Silvia: So in a sense, to me it looks like the ECB has been 
very forceful, sometimes it's been the most forceful institution i guess in the 
entire policy landscape in forcing things - not really forcing things on govern-
ments, but really pushing for political agreement for things that maybe would 
not have been agreed otherwise for.  
 
#00:18:18-3# Rasmus: So you seen that the ECB has kind of stepped up to 
it's mandate? 
 
#00:18:23-1# Silvia: I think, yes, i think i wouldn't say that the ECB has 
been captured in political cycle in Europe, honestly. 
 
#00:18:32-1# Silvia: I mean, there is of course being as always when you 
have a committee deciding things and when this committee is like formed by 
different nations, of course, in the end will end up having conflicting prefer-
ences, but i guess that's kind of normal, and in the end it's the same for every 
institution that brings together (...)  
 
#00:18:52-9# Rasmus: Yeah, yeah, of course  
 
#00:18:53-8# Silvia: (...) many, many representatives, but the point is i think 
in, overall i wouldn't say the ECB is being captured i would say the ECB has 
been quite vocal saying some things. Also on the banking union they have 
been very, Draghi has been very strong on the banking union in a couple of 
instances, we've seen that this is really, especially, for example on resolution 
he had a couple of quotes I don't remember like sometimes he would write a 
couple of quotes saying that resolution is of utmost importance because if su-
pervision is centralized then resolution is.. of course cannot be left completely 
at the national level. 
 
#00:19:33-0# Rasmus: Yeah.  
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#00:19:33-6# Silvia: So i think it's.  
 
#00:19:35-9# Rasmus: Okay.  
 
#00:19:36-3# Silvia: They've been setting a bit 
 
#00:19:38-3# Rasmus: In a more kind of forward looking perspective, and, 
imagining that anything is possible (...) 
 
#00:19:45-5# Silvia: That we are still here next year, yeah?  
 
#00:19:46-8# Rasmus: (laughing)  
 
#00:19:47-4# Silvia: (laughing) Okay.  
 
#00:19:49-1# Rasmus: Errr.  
 
#00:19:49-6# Silvia: It's already a big assumption. (laughing)  
 
#00:19:50-7# Rasmus: Yes. (laughing)  
 
#00:19:51-3# Silvia: No, maybe now it's not anymore, but..  
 
#00:19:55-3# Rasmus: But- erm. We have seen the kind of like ad hoc 
competence expansion of the ECB in that, interpret their mandate a different 
way than prior to the crisis, erm.  
 
#00:20:15-5# Rasmus: And.  
 
#00:20:16-1# Rasmus: My question is that. Do you think that the structure 
of the central bank, the way that it is, erm. It's primary target is to target infla-
tion and not so much on the unemployment or like the FED has, do you think 
that the European Union or the Eurozone would.  
 
#00:20:43-4# Rasmus: Let me try to rephrase this.  
 
#00:20:45-7# Silvia: (laughing) when we move to a 2-pillar target thats ag-
gressive  
 
#00:20:49-5# Rasmus: No. (laughing) What i think is that, (...) 
 
#00:20:51-0# Silvia: (laughing)  
 
#00:20:51-8# Rasmus: (...) being so that the Eurozone has no fiscal redis-
tributional mechanism of any significance and that the central bank is the only 
real centrally placed institution that has economic power over all of the coun-
tries, do you think that the Eurozone would benefit from having a central bank 
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that maybe had competences and more proactive erm.  
 
#00:21:25-5# Silvia: On the real side you say? 
 
#00:21:26-9# Rasmus: Yeah? 
 
#00:21:28-8# Silvia: I'm actually not so sure, because the point is, two 
things. First that the ECB and its mandate does have like wide and broadened 
(incomprehensible)  sustain the economic policy of the Union mandate, which 
of course doesn't mean you have to target i mean, doesn't mean you have to 
target unemployment or anything like.  
 
#00:21:43-8# Rasmus: No.  
 
#00:21:44-0# Silvia: I mean there is some leeway. But apart from that. I 
think we are back to the issue of divergencies.  
 
#00:21:54-7# Silvia: I wouldn't for example like just assume that from to-
morrow on the ECB is going to have a double mandate that says they have to 
target inflation and to target unemployment whatever 
 
#00:22:05-3# Rasmus: No.  
 
#00:22:06-1# Silvia: How would that? Would that be very very helpful in a 
context where countries are so different? Well then all this goes down to the 
question: Will countries be so different in the future? Because it is not neces-
sarily the case. For example the south, in some countries they are rebalancing 
a lot so. What will happen? Will we be, like, all more similar or will we invert? 
So the south is going to turn to savers? and at some point maybe Germany 
will start investing more than they are and so.. What would happen exactly? 
We don't really..  
 
#00:22:43-0# Rasmus: Yeah but, but when we look at the numbers of may-
be the balance of payments and competition-wise, Unit labour cost, you have 
big issues in the south. And. When I, I, our idea is kind of like, when you look 
to the future of the Eurozone, will it still be viable for, if you are in a monetary 
union you need to get more pro's than con's and if you are not about to maybe 
do some debt-restructuring and you, you have to sustain your very very high 
public debt level and is both through internal devaluation towards some kind 
of coming back to normality. Wouldn't it be? (laughing)  
 
#00:23:33-7# Silvia: No, no i mean  
 
#00:23:34-5# Rasmus: (...) more, viable.. but, but.  
 
#00:23:36-8# Silvia: I understand the point of course you would like to 
have, i mean ideally and in theory, if you have a high level you really would 
like to have a little more inflation, a little bit more growth (...) 
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#00:23:44-1# Rasmus: Yes. 
 
#00:23:44-4# Silvia: (...) and a little bit of wage restraints. 
 
#00:23:46-2# Silvia: Now the point is, all this is still come to level. Because 
if you take the Euroarea as a whole its not that the Euroarea as a whole is 
particularly high, and its not that (...)  
 
#00:23:54-8# Rasmus: No.  
 
#00:23:55-1# Silvia: (...) inflation or unemployment are.. Or have been over 
10 years particularly worrying or moving in weird invert way.  
 
#00:24:05-6# Silvia: The real problem of the Euroarea is that whenever you 
look at the Euroarea you are looking at an average, and that the average is 
made by completely out of (laughing) (...) 
 
#00:24:14-8# Rasmus: Yes.  
 
#00:24:15-8# Silvia: (...) deranged things, and so in that sense what 
I'm saying is.. Unless you are telling me you want the ECB to target dif-
ferently in different countries, which i think is going to be impossible, 
well, unless you, i mean (...) 
 
#00:24:31-0# Rasmus: That is what I'm.. 
 
#00:24:31-4# Silvia: (...) you know because we are assuming you are 
in a monetary union, and so, you are assuming, if that is our starting 
assumption that makes sense you have one central bank that is tar-
geting something that is one common interest rate, then if you want to 
move away from that, there is probably thousands of models you can 
think of, (...) 
 
#00:24:49-8# Rasmus: Yeah, Yeah, Yeah, but, Yeah.  
 
#00:24:50-6# Silvia: (...) But then, would it really be compatible with a 
monetary union? So can you have a monetary union, for example, 
where a central bank is targeting the interest rate of the average coun-
try +, i don't know, in the last function of the central bank you have 
that the central bank also cares about variance of the interest rate? I 
don't know? I mean it's something like this.  
 
#00:25:09-1# Silvia: You could think of something like this, but does 
it really, i mean, is it really compatible with a monetary union or not? 
And i think in the end that probably the unemployment i a bit the 
same because you have huge numbers unemployment in Spain, Greece 
and all the periphery and then you have (...) completely different situa-
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tion, completely specular situation, the net immigration of people are 
trying to looking for a job in the other countries in the north, so (...)  
 
#00:25:35-1# Rasmus: So in your 
 
#00:25:35-6# Silvia: (...) what does the average unemployment tell 
you in the end? 
 
#00:25:40-6# Rasmus: So in your opinion the current system is the 
only credible one?  
 
#00:25:45-1# Silvia: No, I think it's, I mean, I think the ECB is being, 
that the inflation targeting has been a good choice i think, ultimately it 
is a political choice, and so, in that sense, you will need to look at the 
preferences of the countries, and why they decided to, i mean we 
know why they decided to go for an inflation target, because the ECB 
was modeled on one specific model of central bank, which i think par-
ticularly effective for all the years before. So. And I think they have 
been very effective anyway, I think, I mean, the other question you 
could ask is whether they should target explicitly financial stability, 
which is something many people say central banks do, so that they 
should have a price stability mandate and a financial stability mandate 
where it is explicitly written that the central bank targets financial sta-
bility. 
 
#00:26:38-3# Rasmus: Yeah.  
 
#00:26:39-7# Silvia: Which in the end doesn't give you, I mean, the 
ECB has been de facto taking care of financial stability in the Euroarea 
in the monetary policy terms.  
 
#00:26:51-9# Rasmus: Yes.  
 
#00:26:53-1# Silvia: And their monetary policy tools and tool kit and 
mandate. So in the end I don't think they did a bad job considering, 
and i don't really, I mean i honestly don't know, I don't see how explicit 
financial stability mandate for example would have given them signifi-
cantly larger competences than they had, (...) 
 
#00:27:11-4# Rasmus: No.   
 
#00:27:11-6# Silvia: (...) for dealing with financial stability, because 
anyway, i mean we are ruling out all the quantitative easing stands, we 
are ruling out the FED-type kind of things on the private side because 
in the end in Europe it wouldn't make much sense, because it's not 
that we have a huge outstanding market of securities, i mean privately 
speaking, so what matters in Europe is like bank loans, so okay? 
 
#00:27:35-7# Silvia: And then on the other hand you are anyway rul-
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ing out all the government purchase on the primary market thing, be-
cause it would be monetary financing, and so i don't see really, like, 
how having a financial stability mandate explicitly expressed would 
have changed much what they could do.  
 
#00:27:53-2# Rasmus: Okay. Thank You.  
 
#00:27:59-1# Rasmus: A last, final question 
 
#00:28:00-7# Silvia: Yeah? 
 
#00:28:01-8# Rasmus: (laughing)  
 
#00:28:04-7# Silvia: (laughing)  
 
#00:28:06-4# Rasmus: erm.  
 
#00:28:06-2# Silvia: (laughing)  
 
#00:28:08-1# Silvia: Shoot! (laughing)  
 
#00:28:09-7# Rasmus: Can you feel how we started with it more like, 
'how's it going' and now we're doing the more (...)  
 
#00:28:15-4# Silvia: (laughing)  
 
#00:28:16-6# Rasmus: (...) dreaming  
 
#00:28:17-5# Silvia: Yeah, dreaming that we could do things (laughing)  
 
#00:28:19-6# Rasmus: Yeah, exactly. (laughing)  
 
#00:28:21-7# Silvia: What (laughing) let's dream we could do things 
(laughing)  
 
#00:28:25-6# Rasmus: You mentioned the no-bailout clause.  
 
#00:28:28-2# Silvia: Okay.  
 
#00:28:29-4# Rasmus: Yeah. And of course it has its merits. But. 
When we look at the current debt levels in several Euro-countries, even 
in Ireland where growth seems to be coming back, we still have ex-
tremely large levels. And. These levels.  
 
#00:28:54-5# Silvia: You mean government debt? 
 
#00:28:55-6# Rasmus: Government debt. And they're expected to rise 
for many years to come and have maybe halvation time of 20-40 
years. And. At that point not even, some countries like Greece won't 
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even go down to the SGP criteria. So. I was thinking that.  
 
#00:29:21-5# Rasmus: Do you think that you could have a kind of a 
control?  
 
#00:29:25-7# Silvia: Debt restructuring? 
 
#00:29:28-2# Rasmus: Yes. Debt restructuring.  
 
#00:29:28-7# Silvia: There is also, i mean on this issue if you want to 
read it there is also something, someone from the EU (Bruegel?) that 
wrote on the possible way to a reasonable debt-restructuring mecha-
nism for the Euroarea 
 
#00:29:38-8# Rasmus: Yes, I, Yes I've heard that 
 
#00:29:41-8# Silvia: (incomprehensible) Some name?  
 
#00:29:40-8# Rasmus: Yes 
 
#00:29:41-0# Silvia: Yeah.  
 
#00:29:41-8# Silvia: No, I think honestly that the point is. It has a 
merit as an idea. I think it's, it is true that if you had really a frame-
work that can allow you to do it in a controlled way, and in a not 
messy and orderly way, that would make sense. Because another rea-
son is that, the point is that I think it's like crucial to distinguish short- 
and long term, so if you were to do something like that, or if you had 
done something like that in the Euroarea over these three years (...) 
 
#00:30:12-5# Rasmus: Yeah 
 
#00:30:12-9# Silvia: (...) I think, orderly, it would have been out of the 
question.  
 
#00:30:16-5# Rasmus: I agree, but in a more future perspective, on 
the other side.  
 
#00:30:18-9# Silvia: In a more future perspective i think it makes 
sense. In a more future perspective, yes. And the IMF is also like, I 
think looking a bit into this issue, if you want to read it, I think i saw a 
paper in which, no, it's not actually a paper, it's a, it's a policy frame-
work that they issued on changing debt restructuring, i mean the way 
the IMF debt restructuring frame works. Or something, that would be 
interesting as well.  
 
#00:30:49-2# Rasmus: Thank you very much 
 
#00:30:50-1# Silvia: Naya.  
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#00:30:52-9# Rasmus: Thank you. Was that about half an hour? I 
think that was? 
 
#00:30:56-5# Silvia: Nah, it's not (laughing)  
 
#00:30:59-4# Ulrich: Yes, it was exactly half an hour 
 
#00:31:00-9# Silvia: Wauw.  
 
 
 
